


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3 March 1986

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



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3 March 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: U.S. CONTINUES TO MOVE FORWARD WITH SDI

Reagan, Weinberger Cited

LD081746 Moscow TASS in English 1742 GMT 8 Feb 86

[Text] Washington, 8 Feb (TASS)--Speaking in the City of Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. President Ronald Reagan said: I'll do everything within my power to move forward with research and testing of a high-tech defense system. Work under the "Star Wars" program, he added, was advancing far more rapidly than envisaged earlier.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, who spoke at the hearings in one of the committees of the House of Representatives, which considers a draft of the Pentagon's budget for 1987 fiscal [year], also said that the United States would implement the SDI program. Simultaneously the defense secretary reiterated that the United States intended to continue the buildup of its nuclear capability and deployment of new types of strategic weapons.

Weinberger said among other things that the Pentagon had no intention of limiting the number of MX intercontinental ballistic missiles to be deployed to fifty, as required by the decision of the U.S. Congress. The secretary said that the Pentagon needed fifty more such missiles. He said that at present the United States had 518 submarine-launched C-4 missiles, four Trident missile submarines and six more such submarines under construction. Weinberger also disclosed that the Pentagon planned to take delivery of 100 new B-1B strategic bombers by the end of the next year.

Reagan Cited

LD062227 Moscow TASS in English 2214 GMT 6 Feb 86

[Text] Washington, February 6 TASS -- President Reagan said today that his administration would not abandon the "star wars" programme. Speaking in Washington, the American President declared that "we have some of America's top scientific minds researching defensive systems that might someday help mankind leave behind the threat of nuclear devastation."

According to many influential experts, however, the implementation of the programme will enhance, rather than diminish the threat of an all-out catastrophe.

Washington is planning to double allocations for the programs in the 1987 financial year as against this year.

Bush Supports SDI

OW040243 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1215 GMT 3 Feb 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by B. Myakota]

[Excerpts]

U.S. Vice President Bush spoke at the Conservative Political Action Conference in Washington. He let it be known that the U.S. Administration has no intention of giving up its policy of state terrorism in the international arena and will continue the course of spreading the arms race in space. Bush said, I assure you that we will never agree to give up SDI at the arms control talks with the Soviet Union. The vice president praised this initiative, which is fraught with universal catastrophe, as one of the gigantic steps forward made in the 20th century. The vice president also listed the massive U.S. rearmament program, which has already swelled to almost \$2 trillion, as one of the greatest achievements of the current administration.

The vice president's speech was actually a formulation of the political platform of Reagan's Republican Party for the mid-term Congressional and local government elections in November this year. Why did the White House deem it necessary to have such a speech at a time when the United States is in mourning, honoring the memory of the seven astronauts who tragically died in the spacecraft Challenger catastrophe. The answer is obvious. The White House is clearly concerned about the mood that has emerged in the United States after the Challenger tragedy. WASHINGTON POST observer McGrory says that it has once again, with special vigor, pointed out the exclusive danger of the course of militarizing space taken by the Washington administration. One of the oldest and most authoritative observers in the United States, Reston, says the Americans have begun to realize that they are dealing with a weapon that might blow up the entire world and over which, despite all the efforts and endeavors, they have no control.

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CSO: 5200/1250

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET GENERAL BELITTLES U.S. SPACE PROGRAM, CONDEMNS SDI

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Aug 85) pp 44-45

[Article, published under the heading "Contemporary Issues," by Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Gen Avn G. Titov, Pilot-Cosmonaut USSR: "Two Worlds, Two Policies"]

[Text] Today's space program involves thousands of space vehicles streaking across the expanses of the universe; it is a vast potential which encompasses the latest advances in various fields of science and technology, and it is people working on the cutting edge of scientific and technological advance. Less than three decades have passed since the Soviet Union launched the world's first artificial earth satellite, and yet the space program has taken a firm place in our lives, having become a branch of the nation's economy. The range of its investigations and practical utilization is unusually broad: communications, television, meteorology, navigation, environmental protection, investigation of earth resources.... They encompass to one degree or another the interests of people of literally all professions. And what a boundless laboratory opened up for scientists with man's entry into space! Unfortunately, however, not all research in space is being conducted in a desirable direction.

Recently I have been asked the following questions at get-togethers with readers: "How could it happen that the space program has become part of the Pentagon's strategic planning?", "Did you military pilots in the first group of cosmonauts imagine that space technology would be used for military purposes?" Readers of the journal AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA also ask such questions in their letters to the editors.

Today, when space technology is frequently presented as some kind of miracle by the Western mass media, it is not particularly difficult for the U.S. Government to arouse the world with the idea of "Star Wars," to present it as a realistic, well-conceived plan to combat means of delivering nuclear weapons. Rank-and-file Americans believe that from a satellite one can practically make out a soldier's rank insignia or eavesdrop on the telephone conversation between two generals traveling in their cars. And those who entertain doubts about this are given assurances that, although this picture is slightly at odds with reality, this is only a temporary situation and that

soon these things will come to pass. This naive attitude is being instilled in the taxpayers for good reason. The American people are impressed by being first and by prestige. The present administration in the White House decided to make use precisely of this, pushing through to please the military-industrial complex the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative," seeking to justify it with the notorious "Soviet military threat."

It is frequently written in the West that the true plans of our space program are concealed, that the Soviet space program has been used for military purposes practically from the very first artificial earth satellite. Twenty-five years have passed since the first group of cosmonauts was formed. It is hardly likely that anything could be concealed over this span of time. And to those who still entertain any doubts I say in all candor and seriousness that none of us entertained the slightest thought of using a spacecraft for military purposes. We were filled with enthusiasm and resolve to overcome more modest difficulties than those which the times have advanced before us today.

K. E. Tsiolkovskiy, our teacher in space exploration and utilization, wrote: "I never work on improving ways of waging war; this is contrary to my spirit. In working on rocket devices, I pursued peaceful, lofty goals: to conquer the universe for the benefit of mankind...." These thoughts as expressed by our great fellow countryman are near and dear to all Soviet cosmonauts. In 1961, when I rode into orbit, I realized and perceived how small and vulnerable our blue planet is, and I realized how wise Tsiolkovskiy had been in his views.

As far back as the mid-1950's U.S. politicians, military experts and scientists were giving considerable thought to the goals the space program should serve. The Americans were the first to announce their intention to launch a satellite, and they were very surprised when this feat was accomplished by the Soviet Union. At that time many people in Washington believed that the Soviet success was purely of a political, prestige significance. But when a second satellite, with a dog on board, was launched into orbit on 3 November, the Americans were forced to acknowledge our scientific accomplishments. Their national pride had been injured. And resounding statements to the effect that the USSR was possibly gaining a military advantage took down a peg or two the Pentagon leaders, who were planning a preventive nuclear war against our country.

The United States commenced a feverish pursuit of the front runner. Thirty-five spacecraft launches worldwide occurred from October 1957 through September 1959 (when the first man-made Soviet vehicle landed on the Moon). Nineteen of these launches failed, and all 19 were U.S. launches. Five of the 35 were Soviet launches, and all were successful. On 15 May 1960 the Soviet Union boosted a fourth satellite into orbit. Its size and weight indicated that our country was surely and certainly picking up the pace in the exploration of space and that manned space flight was not far off.

It is interesting to note that in that same month of May the U.S. intelligence service was put in an awkward position before the entire world -- it was caught red-handed. A U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, flown by U.S. military pilot Francis Gary Powers, was shot down over Soviet soil. This incident

served to give added impetus to the U.S. program to develop photoreconnaissance satellites. Discovery, and subsequently Samos laid down the foundations of spy-in-the-sky systems.

What was the Soviet Union doing at that time? Where was it directing its efforts in space? The world community received answers to these questions literally within 11 months. On 12 April 1961 the Vostok spacecraft carried the first human into space. That same day words filled with humanism rang out from Moscow to the entire world: "We consider the victories in conquering space not only achievements of our people but of all mankind as well.... We place our achievements and discoveries not in the service of war but in the service of peace and the security of peoples. The advance of science and technology opens up endless possibilities for conquering the forces of nature and utilizing them for the benefit of man, and peace must be secured first and foremost toward this end." Nor was this the first such declaration.

Back on 15 March 1958 the Soviet Government made a proposal to ban the use of space for military purposes and called for international cooperation in the area of space exploration. Soviet successes engendered in the United States the fear that the Soviet Union, being in a front-runner position, might also be leading in the military utilization of space. This circumstance made it possible fairly rapidly to conclude a number of treaties on space. These included the Moscow Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere, space, and underwater, the Treaty on the Principles of Activities of Nations Pertaining to Exploration and Use of Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and the Agreement on rescue of cosmonauts and return of cosmonauts and objects launched into space.

Many people felt that space exploration, which was off to such a rapid start in the 1950's, was a boundless area of activity. Therefore initial plans of space exploration proliferated. Communications, navigation, weather and geodetic satellites appeared one after the other, as well as Earth resources satellites. Unmanned probes were dispatched to the Moon and other planets of the solar system. The first space-vehicle exploration missions produced encouraging results. A second, qualitative stage began in the development of space hardware. The principal directions of employment of space vehicles were also defined. At the same time it had become obvious that space programs are very costly, and further exploration of the universe would require joint efforts.

The beginning of the 1970's was marked by a thaw in relations between the USSR and the United States. A number of agreements were concluded on developing joint space programs. Later Pentagon spokesmen claimed that the Soviet Union had taken advantage of detente to surge ahead in its arms program. As is frequently the case, however, they leveled this accusation at us only in order to conceal their own aims. Precisely at that time, when the world was witness to fruitful Soviet-U.S. cooperation, the Pentagon began developing space weapons. General J. Morgan, a top U.S. Air Force official, made an admission in 1976 which today sheds light on the policy of the current White House administration. "The space program," he stated, "was once criticized as a luxury which the nation cannot afford. In the coming decade it will become one of the most reliable cards our country has ever played to ensure its long-

term defense." This was not a prediction being made by a seer. Morgan was basing his opinions on scientific studies pertaining to the development of space weapons.

Dwight Eisenhower was the first U.S. president to view space as a potential theater of military operations in addition to considerations of politics and prestige. He stated in a special message to Congress on 2 April 1958 that the space program should promote "intensification of space-related studies for military purposes by those organizations directly related to national security." John Kennedy stated it in franker terms: "...Just as in past centuries a nation which controlled the oceans was master of the continents, so today he who controls space will be able to control the Earth."

And then we have that speech of 23 March 1983 which aroused worldwide attention. It even acquired a name -- "Star Wars." Most of the statements made in this speech are grounded on the ambitious "High Frontier" project drafted by the Heritage Foundation research center. On the 175 pages of this document its authors advocate the creation of an "absolutely reliable" shield against ballistic missiles for U.S. territory and that of U.S. allies. On the basis of this document, the present Administration called upon scientists and engineers to create "means of making nuclear weapons systems useless and obsolete."

The Americans perceived this speech variously. Some called it pure fantasy, while others enthusiastically support the "Star Wars" idea. In addition, the White House's futurism is covered with a veil of protection of the population against nuclear arms. In spite of the great variety of opinions, however, most people view the U.S. space venture with apprehension, and this is understandable.

Already today the U.S. armed forces have a special command, which has been given the name Space Command. It has its own staff and engages in entirely real activities: planning the use of space assets in the interests of the Department of Defense. The range of missions performed by satellites is rather extensive. They include ship and submarine navigation, communications for the national political and military command authority, for all branches of the armed forces, photographic, electronic, weather, geodetic, and other kinds of reconnaissance, and strategic missile launch detection. Approximately 75 percent of all U.S. satellites are used for military purposes. Research and development of the ASAT antisatellite system is in full swing, while Pentagon plans call for building and deploying new kinds of offensive weaponry in space.

The present Administration's actions pertaining to the development of offensive space weaponry pursuant to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" appear strange, to put it mildly. It would seem that top U.S. political and military leaders have forgotten about the existence of the 26 May 1972 ABM treaty, Article 5 of which states that the parties to the treaty pledge not to develop, test or deploy sea, air, space, or mobile land-based ABM systems or components. And when the illegality of various actions directed toward militarization of space is pointed out to them, they twist and turn, looking for loopholes to justify their actions in the eyes of the public.

Frequently spokesmen of the present Administration openly and deliberately slander the Soviet Union. This was the case, for example, during the first round of Soviet-U.S. nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, when the Americans declared the space objects tracking station near Krasnoyarsk to be a missile attack early warning radar system.

The disinclination on the part of top U.S. leaders to consider the objective linkage between offensive and defensive strategic systems and to grasp the logic of nuclear confrontation seems even more bizarre. Establishment of a large-scale ABM system, such as Washington is contemplating, will disrupt the strategic balance, for hopes of warding off a retaliatory strike cannot be viewed other than a buildup of offensive potential.

Just how should our country conduct itself under the circumstances? What kind of response measures can the USSR take? The USSR minister of defense and the chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces noted in this connection that the Soviet Union has no other option but to take response measures. The nature of these measures will be determined by the Soviet leaders, and they will be adequate to that threat which can be presented to the Soviet Union and its allies. The initiators of "Star Wars" should not forget that "the development of offensive space weapons will inevitably result in diminished security for both the United States and its allies."

We would like the Soviet position at the talks being held in Geneva to be correctly understood by the peoples of the world. We do not seek to gain any unilateral advantages and we have no intentions of threatening anybody. We want to live in peace and to maintain normal relations with other countries. "We propose to the U.S. Government," stated CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, "that things be done in such a manner that it is evident to all -- to our peoples and to other countries -- that the policies of the USSR and the United States are directed not toward animosity and confrontation but rather toward the search for mutual understanding and peaceful development."

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: SDI TO LEAD TO 'DESTABILIZATION' OF WORLD SITUATION

LD020307 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 1 Feb 86

[TASS military affairs observer Vladimir Bogachev commentary]

[Text] According to recommendations of specialists working for the Pentagon, the American "Star Wars" program should provide for the siting in space of several thousand units of strike weapons, deployed in seven tiers, mostly over the territory of the socialist countries. The system covers the use of a vast number of computers which must ensure a transition from a manual system of guiding combat operations to a fully automatic one. Computers can replace people in deciding on a nuclear war. And it is getting increasingly more obvious even if stationed on the ground, computers do not ensure 100 percent reliability of their decisions or correctness of their conclusions and estimates. Computer errors which, even in peacetime, lead to sorry consequences, can bring off a world wide disaster in a critical international situation.

Scientists note that the combat guidance computers for the "star wars" plan may activate systems of American strike weapons in space in response to signals that have nothing to do with a nuclear missile attack; for example, signals due to small disturbances of the environment or even without them at all. The putting of the ABM systems on combat alert as a result of such signals can be regarded by the other side as preparation for a first strike, with all the ensuing consequences. The newspaper WASHINGTON POST recently quoted a scientist hired by the Pentagon concerning computers for "star wars" as saying that the computers were doing strange things one could not possibly visualize. At times they did one thing and, at other times, something else.

Pentagon specialists are now developing an expert ABM computer system. This man-made intellect system contains in its program, among other things, estimates of the military political situation for decision making about the start of war. This American project is a product of the psychology and mentality of those United States leaders who are known to have, to the greatest extent, an unobjective, distorted view of the Soviet Union's intentions and the greatest readiness to use arms of mass annihilation in conflict situations. One can well picture the consequences for our planet that can be brought by "star wars" computer programs based, say, on estimates by White House consultants Edward Teller or Colin Gray, with the latter holding the belief that victory is possible for the United States in a nuclear war.

United States Administration officials are trying to convince the Americans that some sort of miracle will happen with the realization of the "star wars" program, a miracle that will do away in one go with all the highly dangerous technical defects of American

strike space weapons and of the electronic system for their guidance. These hopes are extremely illusory. On the other hand, it is quite apparent that continued work in the United States under the "star wars" program may lead only to a sharp destabilization of the military political situation in the world. The risk of nuclear war will be rising, including the risk due to errors in estimating the situation because of malfunctions in the warning systems and computers.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

WEINBERGER REMARKS IN DETROIT SPEECH CRITICIZED BY USSR

Shuttle Delays Regretted

LD312036 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 31 Jan 86

[Correspondent Vladimir Dunayev dispatch from Washington]

[Text] Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger surprised Americans today. In the very hours when the country is preparing to bid farewell to the astronauts who died tragically, Weinberger found it possible to make a speech in which the only regret he expressed was that there would now be some delay in fresh launches of space shuttle craft. The delay will not be for just a day, the Pentagon chief said, and this means it will have a serious effect on our plans and programs, the Pentagon's plans and programs, and especially on preparations for SDI, as the invitation [as heard] to "star wars" is called in Washington. Even on the day of mourning Weinberger could not keep himself from speaking on his favorite theme, openly admitting that the space shuttle that suffered disaster worked mainly for "star wars." And the Pentagon chief called detente a childish illusion. I am quoting a speech by Weinberger made in the Economic Club of Detroit: The text of the speech has just been distributed by the Pentagon.

Weinberger can hardly be expressing the feelings of disappointed and dispirited Americans, whom they have tried to convince that flights of shuttle craft are outings without danger to which both teachers and journalists can be invited. In the opinion of well-known observer, Mary McGrory, the consequences of the tragedy are unpleasant, and not only as concerns the space program, as she writes in THE WASHINGTON POST. The President must admit that his "star wars" require ideal, super-reliable technology. The whole program rests on the assumption that millions of systems and mechanisms have to work to a computer's command faultlessly and in synchronism with extraordinary precision, to thousandths of a second. This assumption has now proved to be highly questionable following the spacecraft's disaster.

And today it is especially appropriate to ask the President, McGrory writes, can the solution to earth's problems not be found on the ground, and not in space?

Accelerated Deployment Called For

LD311958 Moscow TASS in English 1945 GMT 31 Jan 86

[Text] Moscow, January 31 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

At the time when American scientists engaged in "star wars" research programmes increasingly arrive at the conclusion that various aspects of the U.S. universal space-

based defence are technically unattainable and warn about the possibility of losing control over the strike arms in near-terrestrial space, their employers from the Pentagon continue their noisy propaganda campaign about the mythical successes of the "Strategic Defense Initiative".

Addressing on Thursday members of the Economic Club of Detroit the United States Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger contended that the programme of implementing the SDI is making "dramatic progress" and voiced the opinion that not "star wars" plans but hopes of Americans for a relaxation of international tension could become the main obstacle on the road to a "safer and more stable world".

The head of the Pentagon said that the disaster of the Challenger spaceship could slow down work to create space strike weapons. It follows from Weinberger's speech that the United States intends again to hold tests of the "Minuteman" and "Titan" ICBM to give them the capability of anti-missiles, this being a flagrant violation of the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

The calls by the United States Secretary of Defense to speed up the deployment of American nuclear arms on earth, to continue the course that might prove to be irretrievably costly to the whole of mankind.

'Irresponsible Opinions'

PM311702 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "Back-To-Front Logic"]

[Text] Washington, 31 Jan--U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger has made a speech in Detroit which without exaggeration could be called a policy statement of the U.S. militarists, who are trying to justify the utmost fueling to the arms race, global expansionism, and diktat.

Arbitrarily distorting the real state of affairs, Weinberger advanced along the well-trodden path of accusing the Soviet Union of various "machinations," a "never-ending buildup of military potential," and attempts to "subjugate the world" and of course "seize America," which--of course!--before the advent of the present administration was unilaterally disarming.

What methods does the Pentagon chief propose? The traditional methods: "Whoever has followed the Soviet Union in the last few years will understand that the present state of our relations with Moscow...depends on our ability to continue to act from a position of strength. This is a fact of life. It is the result of what we have learned since World War II, that is that the West's security and peace throughout the world depends absolutely on U.S. military might." Back-to-front logic, and what else is there to say.

...Thus, black is passed off as white to Americans. Thus, with the authority of a responsible post being used as a cover, attempts are being made to hammer home to them irresponsible opinions.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: 'CYNICISM, HYPOCRISY' IN U.S. ARMS CONTROL

LD031800 Moscow TASS in English 1747 GMT 3 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 3 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev.

While the White House proclaims in Washington that "the United States has been and remains in compliance with all treaty obligations and political commitments," U.S. Defence Assistant Secretary Richard Perle declares on the same day in Switzerland that under the "star wars" program the Pentagon intends to spread a "dome" of space strike arms over the territory of socialist countries, that is to violate deliberately the 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty on ABM, and norms of international law.

The cynicism and hypocrisy of representatives of the U.S. Administration in interpreting provisions of international treaties on arms limitation and reduction assumed truly unprecedented scopes of late.

Unlike high officials of the White House, the self-same Perle, addressing an international conference of businessmen and politicians in Davos, did not even try to pretend that the United States observes its obligations under the 1972 treaty. The assistant of the Pentagon's chief, specifically, alleges that the United States has the right to break agreements on ABM since the Soviet Union has almost created an ABM "space shield" of its own.

Perle's crude falsifications in the sphere of the observance of international agreements clearly have a propaganda nature. They could be ignored if they did not pursue the aim of justifying a quite concrete sinister military program of the United States which American journalists call euphemistically "high risk space strategy."

The world now faces the choice: Either the infinite space remains peaceful or a practically irreversible process of its militarization with "domes" of strike arms will be started, with the "domes" which will surely appear not only over the territory of socialist countries.

The Soviet Union has pledged itself that it will not be the first to emplace strike arms in space. The USSR strictly adheres to its commitments under the termless ABM Treaty as a whole and in particulars. If the United States really complied with its treaty obligations, including those under the 1972 Treaty, the earth would be a safer place for humanity to live.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: SPACE WARFARE BECOMING U.S. 'MAINSTREAM POLICY'

LD051543 Moscow TASS in English 1415 GMT 5 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 5 TASS -- TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

A super-fast "transatmospheric" craft is being developed within the framework of the U.S. policy of militarization of outer space. It is a component of the "star wars" program, officially known as the "Strategic Defence Initiative." The President mentioned the project in his "State of the Union" address to the joint sitting of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress on Tuesday [4 February]. It is known as an Orient Express and models of the craft, according to UPI, are being developed by Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas and the Rockwell International Corporation.

U.S. specialists say that the craft is intended to fly both in the atmosphere and in near-earth space at a speed 25 times the speed of sound.

If we leave aside sensationalism, on which Washington is obviously laying emphasis nowadays, we may wonder about the purpose of the project. The U.S. CBS T.V. company noted today that the craft would be able to carry heavier payloads (than the Challenger shuttle space ship, which crashed recently) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as it develops space stations, and also for the Pentagon as it builds a "star wars" system.

The craft is really intended for "star wars" because it is obvious from Reagan's "State of the Union" address that SDI actually constitutes the foundation for the future of America as a whole. This means that preparations for nuclear warfare, inter alia, in space, far from being cancelled by the U.S. Administration, are becoming a mainstream policy. The arms race is being spurred on in every field and Washington will not be able to justify it by any rhetoric. It is being carried on to make the U.S. nuclear arms arsenals invulnerable and to give Washington a free hand to deliver the first nuclear strike. Defending their "star wars" program, administration officials are claiming that the United States is developing systems capable of detecting Soviet missile launchings within one minute and destroying them in the initial phase of their flight. But this precisely constitutes a first nuclear strike doctrine: With such a strategy it is always possible to fake Soviet missile launchings and to activate space strike systems.

However, the United States does not have a monopoly of the development of advanced military technology and what it can do in the field of advanced weaponry can be done

by others. This is illustrated by today's balance of forces. However, by going ahead with its "star wars" program, the U.S. Administration is throwing the doors to space wide open for the arms race. The Soviet Union suggests in its latest initiatives that nuclear disarmament should be started today, before it is too late, on the condition that the militarization of space is prevented, and that mankind should be rid of these weapons by the end of the current millennium. The two programs -- the U.S. "star wars" and the Soviet "star peace" -- are thus the exact opposites.

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CSO: 5200/1250

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: U.S. POLICY AIMS AT 'DECISIVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY'

LD301738 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 30 Jan 86

[Text] Moscow, January 30 TASS -- TASS commentator Leonid Ponomarev writes: The Pentagon is going to award 550 contracts to develop and build various components for space weaponry in keeping with the "star wars" program this year and another 150 such contracts next year, according to the American magazine AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY.

Hundreds of firms are already involved in what is called the "Strategic Defense Initiative" project. They include such giants from the U.S. military-industrial complex as Lockheed, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell, Hughes and Litton. The U.S. Administration's budget estimates for 1985 through 1990 provide for earmarking a total of 32.2 billion dollars for the SDI effort.

There is ample evidence, including statements by Washington officials, that the U.S. Government has already embarked on practical work to prepare for "star wars". Its coverup claims that the SDI effort at this stage is limited to nothing more than research cannot conceal the militarist, aggressive substance of this program, a large-scale plan to develop space strike weapons.

Importantly, these arms are to be created in addition to rather than instead of the enormous U.S. offensive nuclear potential, which is borne out by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's latest classified defense guidance directive for 1988-93. According to U.S. wire services, it was signed on December 31, 1985, and says that the Pentagon will be giving the "star wars" effort the same high priority as that enjoyed by its program for a strategic nuclear buildup.

It follows from all this that in Washington they continue to be guided not by a desire to limit and eliminate nuclear arms on earth, which is what the Soviet Union suggests doing, but by illusory hopes to gain decisive military superiority and acquire a position to deal a first nuclear strike with impunity through space militarization.

The Soviet Union has proposed making certain that mankind will enter the third millennium with plans not for "star wars" but for peaceful space exploration by the joint efforts of all nations. The development of space strike weapons, as the USSR has warned repeatedly, will kill hopes for nuclear arms reductions on earth. Outer space must be peaceful.

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CSO: 5200/1250

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

COMPUTERS' ROLE IN SDI PROGRAM CRITICIZED BY TASS

LD292145 Moscow TASS in English 2117 GMT 29 Jan 86

[Text] Moscow, January 29 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

According to the recommendations of specialists employed by the Pentagon, the U.S. "star wars" program should envision the deployment in space of several thousand units of strike weapons in seven tiers, mostly over the territories of socialist countries.

That space monster will be put together so that it could be switched into action instantaneously, without the other side detecting preparations for an act of aggression. This system should incorporate a huge number of computers to enable, as journalists say, transition from "manual" to "fully automatic" control of combat operations.

Computers should work out in a matter of seconds or at most minutes decisions of exceptional importance, which could take days, weeks or even months for hundreds of politicians and generals to arrive at in preparations for conventional warfare. Computers can thus make people obsolescent in deciding the question of nuclear war.

It is becoming more and more obvious that computers, even if they are ground-based, cannot guarantee 100 per cent dependability in decision making or produce absolutely correct conclusions and evaluations. Computer errors, which bring about regrettable consequences in peace time, can trigger world catastrophe in an international crisis.

Scientists say that computers involved in combat control under the "star wars" plans may activate the system of American space strike weapons in response to signals which have absolutely nothing to do with a nuclear missile attack, for instance, as a consequence of slight disturbances in the environment or even without them. The alerting of ABM systems as a result of such signals can be taken by the other side for preparation for the first strike with all the ensuing consequences of this move. THE WASHINGTON POST recently quoted a Pentagon scientist as saying about "star wars" computers that they do strange things which are impossible to predict and that they do one thing at one time and quite a different thing at another.

Pentagon specialists are now developing the so-called "expert system" of ABM computers, that is, a system of artificial intellect the program of which incorporates evaluations of the military-political situation with a view to taking decision on launching a war. This American program is a product of the mentality of those U.S. leaders who have an especially biased and even paranoid perception of the intentions of the Soviet Union and who are trigger-happy in conflict situations. One can imagine the consequences for the world if "star wars" computer programs are based on the evaluations of White House advisers Edward Teller or Colin Gray, who thinks that the USA can win a nuclear war.

Administration officials are trying to convince the Americans that as the "star wars" program goes ahead a "miracle" will happen, removing at one stroke all the extremely dangerous technological faults of U.S. space strike weapons and the electronic system controlling them. But these hopes are very illusory.

On the other hand, it is perfectly obvious that the continuation of the American "star wars" program can only lead to the dramatic destabilization of the military-political situation in the world. Military-strategic parity will be restored but at a higher level -- all through the fault of the American side.

The risk of a nuclear outbreak will grow, inter alia, because of errors in the evaluation of the situation and in early warning systems and computers, and also because of the self-activation of components of the U.S. ABM system.

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CSO: 5200/1250

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA 2 FEBRUARY REVIEW OF WEEK'S INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

PMO21845 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 86 First Edition p 4

[Nikolay Prozhogin "International Review"]

[Excerpts]

The week that ends today marked the conclusion of the first month of 1986. The New Year festival now seems long past.

The life of the peoples in the different countries has slipped into its usual rhythm with its daily preoccupations, joys and misfortunes, labor and struggle. The events that took place in the world last week were multifaceted and often contradictory. But whichever of these events make the front page, the main problems remaining at the focus of the international public's attention, if one is talking about the world as a whole, were those raised in CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January statement. Obviously, it is on their solution that the future of all mankind depends.

Collaboration and Cooperation

These problems occupied a prominent place in M.S. Gorbachev's Moscow conversations with Italian Communist Party (PCI) Secretary General A. Natta. The conversations confirmed the readiness of both parties to vigorously support the cessation of the arms race and non-militarization of space, the prevention of nuclear war and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, a general improvement in the international situation and development of cooperation between the USSR and Italy. There was confirmation of the CPSU's resolve to develop equitable, comradely relations with the PCI in the interests of peace and socialism.

In view of the complexity of the present-day international situation and the different historical development in our countries, there is nothing unnatural in the fact that the CPSU and the PCI differ in their assessment of particular problems, events, and facts. This makes fraternal dialogue between them, and with all communist parties, all the more valuable and necessary. The CPSU wants this dialogue to develop, taking on forms that correspond to the spirit and demands of the present day. It will help to overcome the problems, difficulties, and differences that exist in our movement on certain questions, which will contribute to further strengthening the communist's role in the struggle against the nuclear menace and for peace and socialism and the very difficult and responsible role that communists play in general.

The CPSU sees comradely cooperation between communists from different countries, free from all that is petty and alien, as an important element in collaboration among all

left-wing, democratic, antiwar forces, of which they are an integral component. By coming together, these forces are capable of operating with much greater coordination than hitherto in the struggle against the war threat. It is no secret that on some questions, the differences between the various left-wing currents sometimes outweigh agreement. But no matter how deep their differences appear, they are far less important than the common task, the common desire to prevent nuclear war.

The conclusion is self-evident: We must not accumulate and cultivate differences; we must take note of them and seek a common denominator for collaboration and cooperation on the cardinal problem of the present day -- the elimination of the threat of nuclear war that confronts mankind.

Space Must Be Peaceful

The Soviet plan for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a situation of the nonmilitarization of space has been carefully studied, analyzed, and commented on this past week. Essentially, the new Soviet proposals have begun to take on a life of their own. This confirms that they meet the demands of the times.

Of course, the Soviet Union does not expect the implementation of our initiatives to be a simple and straightforward affair. There are many confirmed and stubborn opponents of disarmament in the West.

These politicians express the interests of those monopoly-capital circles which see the further buildup of the pace of the arms race as a source of income and, at the same time, hope to turn it into an instrument for wearing socialism down economically and into a means of using military-power pressure against other unwelcome forces in the international arena. While neglecting their own countries' national interests and placing mankind's future on the line, they are bewitched by the fanciful dream of achieving world supremacy.

There is another real obstacle in the way of radical disarmament. It is the mental inertia apparent in the reluctance or inability of some politicians to recognize the cardinal changes taking place in the world. One of the changes that has created a new situation is the flooding of the world with nuclear armaments, which carries the seed of worldwide catastrophe.

The Soviet proposals are addressed primarily to the United States, as is known. President R. Reagan at first issued a statement welcoming them and promising that they would be carefully studied. But since then there has been a pause lasting more than 2 weeks.

The Western press, including the U.S. press, explains this silence by saying that the Soviet proposals "took the Reagan administration by surprise" and caused disagreements to erupt again between the State Department and the Pentagon. In particular, this is the view of the author of an article in THE WASHINGTON POST. The Soviet proposals, he writes, "again revealed the profound difference of opinion in the administration on arms control questions" -- which, however, will "scarcely do as an excuse for the inability to prepare in good time a reply which would promote dialogue" in that sphere. "Shocking evidence of weakness" is how Democratic Senator W. Proxmire described the U.S. Administration's "equivocal and over general" reaction to the Soviet proposals.

The Washington administration's sluggishness is causing increasing concern among U.S. allies, with which the United States promised to discuss the Soviet proposals.

"The delaying tactics being used by the administration," a correspondent for the British paper THE GUARDIAN reported from Washington, "is causing discontent...and, if they continue, could lead to the allies' expressing impatience."

It is clear from statements by senior Washington leaders and from numerous press articles that Washington's "hesitation" is probably chiefly due to the reluctance of certain circles to give up the pernicious "star wars" idea. "Critics of Reagan's policy on strategic issues," THE GUARDIAN correspondent writes, "will find little solace in the budget for 1987 which is to be presented to congress early next week. It envisages, in particular, a doubling of expenditure on the 'Strategic Defense Initiative,' which the Russians call the main obstacle to real progress at the Geneva talks."

Yes, the Soviet Union is a principled and implacable opponent of the "star wars" project. The Soviet position is dictated by the fact that universal, 100-percent space defense is impossible. Consequently, even if an actual "shield" really were created in space it would result in a further, unbridled arms race -- in not only nuclear but other arms, based on new physical principles. The widely publicized U.S. "space shields" project is at best an illusion both from the technical and from the economic and political viewpoints. But if a "space shield" were created, it could easily be turned into a "space sword."

The USSR does not intend to compete with the United States in the unsavory sphere of space militarization. But anyone who insists on this must be aware that our country would have the military and technical potential to redress the balance.

However, a space arms race could be too expensive -- impossible for both our countries and for mankind as a whole.

The Soviet Union's counter to the "star wars" plan is a "star peace" plan. It is addressed to the United States and to all the other states, and the proposal is the creation of an international organization for the peaceful exploration of space for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

Man's entry into space, which has taken place during the lifetime of our generation and which was an important intellectual achievement, is only the first step toward truly boundless horizons.

The disaster involving the U.S. Challenger space shuttle was a reminder of the difficulties and risks to human life posed by the exploration of space.

This tragic event has made Americans wonder about the "star wars" plan. THE NEW YORK TIMES writes that at least some congressmen will see the "Challenger incident" as evidence that the complex technology intended for SDI could also fail. The well-known observer J. Reston writes: "Washington figures belonging to both political parties have begun to realize that they are dealing with weapons which can blow up the world and which, even if they are treated with the utmost care, may not always be possible for them to control. This is the somber background to the tragedy which occurred in the sky above Florida." It "compels President Reagan to look again at the problem of space weapons."

But it looks as if the sober voices have again alarmed the advocates of "star wars" preparations. The U.S. press reports that certain "officials in the administration and in Congress have expressed the hope that the part of the space program planned by the

Pentagon will not suffer as a result of the Challenger explosion." The President himself came to their aid. The day before yesterday he addressed the Conservative Political Action Conference and, although not mentioning his beloved SDI, his speech was clearly intended to encourage the "hawks" to reach "for the stars and beyond."

As for Soviet people, sharing the American people's sense of grief, they are convinced that the best memorial to those who perished in the Challenger disaster would be a more sensible approach to the realities of the present-day world, a resolute rejection of the plans to militarize space, and the adoption of a firm course of peaceful space exploration.

Disarmament for Development

The course pursued in international economic relations by the leading capitalist states in recent years has led to a sharp deterioration of the climate in this sphere. There are increasing crises in world economic ties as a result. A destabilization of trade, economic, foreign exchange, scientific, and technical relations among states is taking place. This course has a particularly pernicious effect on the developing countries' position. It blocks the process of improving international economic relations and restructuring them on a just a democratic basis. The economic security of states is jeopardized.

The line of the imperialist states -- first and foremost the United States -- of whipping up tension and looking for military, strong-arm solutions to international problems is obviously the main obstacle in the way of the normal development of the world economy and international economic cooperation. The cranking up of the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, and the plans for the militarization of space -- not to mention creating a threat to the maintenance of life itself on earth -- are doing enormous damage to mankind and diverting gigantic resources away from development needs.

Take, for instance, the unprecedentedly acute problem of the developing countries' foreign debt to the West. It is now nearing \$1 trillion only slightly ahead of the \$800 billion sum that the world annually spends on arms. And the already excessive interest payments are again going to enrich monopolies and finance the Western countries' budget deficits and military programs.

This occurs at a time when 400 million people living in the developing countries are systematically undernourished, 100 million children deprived of the opportunity to study.

The baneful effect of military spending is also obvious in examining the situation in the developed capitalist states. Take the United States, with its chronic unemployment disaster. According to U.S. labor union figures, \$1 billion in spending provides 58,000 jobs on military projects but could create 83,000 jobs in transportation or 84,000 in construction.

The list of similar facts and figures could be continued. We will restrict ourselves to just one more. There are explosives equivalent to 4,000 kg of TNT for every person on earth, while at the same time there is a per capita shortage of 300 kg of food.

All this runs glaringly counter to the demands of elementary reason, and it is time to put a stop to the state of affairs that has been created. This was clearly, accurately, and cogently stated in the USSR Government memorandum "The International Economic Security of States Is an Important Condition for Improving International Economic Relations."

The principle imposed by militarism -- arms instead of development -- must be turned upside down: disarmament for development.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

CERIS PRESIDENT ADVOCATES FRENCH SDI PARTICIPATION

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Jan 86 p 9

/Article by Jean-Marie Benoist, professor of philosophy/

/Text/ Jean-Marie Benoist, president of CERIS (European Center for International Relations and Strategy), who organized in Paris on 18 and 19 October 1985 a colloquy on President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, answers below the comments in the interview that Paul Quiles, minister of defense, gave LE MONDE on this issue following his official visit to the United States (see LE MONDE of 18 December 1985).

By favoring the exchange of information at the highest level, the CERIS colloquy had as its goal to clear up the misunderstandings, prejudices, and dangerous myths circulated in connection with the SDI, improperly dubbed "Star Wars." There were excessive favorable hasty myths tending to make it believed that SDI "does away with" deterrence, or negative rumors stemming from theological rejection and doctrinaire opposition turning down the evolution and even the flexibility of deterrence, this last archaic position being, unfortunately, the official stance of the present French administration.

The success of this colloquy, attended by over 300 officials of whom 70 or so were representatives of the general staff and the defense community as well as executives of the industrial sector, stemmed from its ability to fulfill several expectations and to answer some basic questions, namely:

1. To reassert the farreaching compatibility of the SDI with the conventional logic of deterrence, which has rested so far on a monopoly of offensive weapons;
2. To remove the debate about the SDI from the indiscreet and undue sway of a public opinion debate, since the SDI is an irrevocable fact: The U.S. Government has taken this path, as Jacques Chirac asserted forcefully, and it will stay on its course no matter what we say, what we do, and despite the hysterical or religious opposition flowing from some European adversaries and especially, unfortunately, French Socialists.

It was also possible, thanks to the publication of the White Paper signed by George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger describing the Soviet defensive systems, to gauge the scope of the SDI programs that the USSR has been pursuing over

the past 20 years in violation of its treaties signed with the United States. In this connection, President Reagan's SDI is not the result of an arbitrary decision but rather of the need to meet a challenge; it is an answer, a defensive reaction as much as an initiative.

We also had the opportunity, thanks to this meeting on an equal basis between Europeans and Americans, to examine the technological and industrial impacts that this strategic revolution may have on civilian and military research in the United States as well as Europe, if the official opposition and inhibitions of France are lifted. The latter stem from its refusal to take into account a certain number of conceptual and strategic facts of which it is appropriate to remind President Francois Mitterrand and his minister Paul Quiles.

A Long-term Process

The strategic revolution begun by the SDI is not an immediate revolution in its effects, but it constitutes a long-term process guided by a standard principle: the elimination of the reign of terror caused by weapons of mass destruction. But this perspective, or this principle, could not be conceivable for several decades; in the meantime it demands that, parallel to the research of the SDI, considerable efforts be made to reduce the threat inherent in the imbalances of conventional and nuclear forces.

In the immediate future, the nuclear strike forces and the prospect of massive retaliation continue to be the key element of deterrence while their modernization, credibility, and flexibility of use represent indispensable assets of our security, and in particular the modernization of the French and British forces whose renovation is an imperative of deterrence.

However, a negative and inhibiting position concerning the SDI adopted directly by the French Government threatens to prevent France from initiating vital research in the field of space defense in conjunction with our American and European allies and to prevent the making of a decisive move. The attitude of the French president threatens to leave France stranded when it comes to research and strategic and technical development which will progress without France.

Now, our American allies are not only ready to allow the Europeans to work on that aspect of the SDI response that concerns them, that is, the response slated to check the threat of intermediate- and short-range nuclear missiles aimed at Europe. But they are also open to any form of association that would make possible joint basic research in those areas where the Europeans have something to offer in the more general fields of the SDI: laser beams, satellites, and so on.

Another argument concerns the "isolationist" character of the SDI which, because it would establish an absolutely airtight shield, would supposedly be content with protecting the territory of the United States exclusively. If this were true, there would be an additional reason for us to become involved in the SDI to avoid renewed reliance on the American fortress.

To Strengthen "Linkage"

But this notion of a 100 percent airtight American shield is utopian. On the contrary, the envisioned partial shield which would boost the defense of some civilian or military sites will make it possible for the second strike and retaliation forces to remain essentially intact and to enter the battle if necessary. The SDI assists in this connection in beefing up deterrence and linkage of the American and European allies to the extent that our defensive systems challenging the Soviet missiles at several stages of their trajectory can inhibit both launchings targeting Europe and those aimed at the United States.

Finally, the SDI has enriched deterrence with a qualifying supplementary element by illustrating the dynamic character of the logic of deterrence.

It would indeed be erroneous to see deterrence as an immutable dogmatic strategy based on the indefinite perpetuation of the means that it involves at a given point. If it is true that assured mutual destruction, or MAD, has been effective in the decades following Hiroshima as the backbone of deterrence, the past 10 years have prompted this rigid concept to evolve and to become enriched with complementary determinations.

As our cities can be held at ransom as mutual hostages, it became necessary to add new elements of response to face the specific "counterforce" weapons, the Soviet SS-20's which had destabilized the logic of mutual assured destruction. In this sense one could not but be gratified to see President Mitterrand take such a judicious position in his speech at the Bundestag, encouraging the positioning of NATO's Euromissiles in Europe. To face Soviet destabilization it was necessary to increase the surprise element of our response.

The Pershing and cruise missiles, the lowering of the nuclear threshold at an early stage of the battle involving the neutron bomb--all those elements have come to confirm on one hand that the logic of mutual assured destruction is an absolute or central core of deterrence which could be enriched with complementary elements and on the other hand that, contrary to clumsy theories, one cannot say that "only nuclear power deters nuclear power."

Still, deterrence appears more than ever as a complex weapons network with minimal numbers qualitatively necessary in each strong point to insure both the credibility of our response and the surprise of our strikes, that is, of the "profile" of this ripost.

By adding to this complex deterrence network in the geographic continuity of the alliance and the temporal continuity of intervention with weapons without our adversary's being able to anticipate the timing or magnitude of intervention, the SDI arrives at the right time to enrich this logic of complexity and thus consolidate the deterrence on which peace in Europe and the North Atlantic has been based for the past 40 years.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

TASS CITES WEINBERGER ON ABM--Washington, 6 Feb (TASS)--The United States is prepared to renounce the ABM Treaty in order to fully implement its "Star Wars" programme. This has been directly stated in hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee by Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger. He has emphasized that, if during current research the Pentagon succeeds in working out a reliable anti-missile defense system, the USA should not hesitate for a second and should deploy such a program. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0022 GMT 6 Feb 86 LD] /9274

TASS HITS WEINBERGER'S SECRET DIRECTIVE--Washington, 30 Jan (TASS)--The Pentagon attaches paramount significance along with the programmes of a build-up of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal, to the development of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense system with outer space-based elements. This is stressed in a secret directive of Caspar Weinberger, the Pentagon chief, on the guidelines for the construction of the U.S. Armed Forces, which was signed on 31 December last year. This directive, the AP agency said, is the basic document used by the command of the kinds of service of the U.S. Armed Forces in determining long-term plans. According to the UPI agency, it is for the first time that in a directive of the U.S. defence secretary, the "Star Wars" program is placed, in its importance, on a par with the programmes for a modernization of the U.S. strategic nuclear force. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0929 GMT 30 Jan 86 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/1250

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET PANEL DISCUSSES AIMS, HIGHLIGHTS OF NEW GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

LD032105 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1840 GMT 3 Feb 86

[Program entitled "Disarmament in the Name of Peace and Progress" presented by political observer Boris Kalyagin with Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy, member of the USSR Foreign Ministry Collegium; Academician Roald Zinnurovich Sagdeyev, director of the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Colonel General Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; date and place not given -- live or recorded]

[Text] [Kalyagin] Hello, comrades! Nearly 3 weeks have passed since the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was published. The new peace proposals contained in the statement are now being closely studied. They are being analyzed and commented on by politicians and public figures, press organs, and radio and television observers of all persuasions and virtually all countries of the world. Such heightened interest is quite understandable, for the matter concerns things that worry everyone -- the future of mankind.

For the first time in history a detailed, specific, and realistic program with precisely calculated dates has been put forward for the complete and ubiquitous elimination of all nuclear weapons in this very century. The overwhelming majority of people have greeted these proposals with approval and hope. At the same time in the West, first and foremost in the United States, other voices are also being heard, such as that of those who would like to belittle the importance of the Soviet initiatives, to show up vulnerable spots in them, so to speak, which, they say, encroach on the interests of the West. Attempts are also being made to simply distort the meaning of individual Soviet proposals. Taking all this into account, in this program we would like to analyze the responses to the Soviet peace program and to dwell in more detail on those issues that are now being particularly inflated by Western propaganda organs.

So, what can be said on the whole about the reaction of foreign states? Which basic points should be singled out in this reaction? The first question is for you, Vladimir Fedorovich.

[Petrovskiy] I think that certainly when talking about the reaction to the set of new foreign policy initiatives that were put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 February this year, one must say that no one has remained indifferent to our initiatives. Of course, this reaction has not been uniform in various countries. Our friends in the socialist world have taken the Soviet proposals as a matter that concerns them very closely, as an important contribution to the realization of the common, concerted line of socialist countries that was worked out in Sofia and Prague.

The overwhelming majority of young, developing states are also greeting our peace initiatives and rightly believe that they do not only secure [corrects himself] that their realization not only guarantees security for all, but also creates prospects for eliminating such acute problems as the elimination of hunger, disease, debt, and economic backwardness. What is characteristic is that even in the West, nobody has decided to brush aside our proposals. Realistic-minded politicians, scientists, and public figures see in them a sign of a change for the better in international relations. However, even those circles in the West that usually immediately declare everything proposed by the Soviet Union to be propaganda -- even those circles have found themselves in a difficult position.

Boris Aleksandrovich, you ask which central points are singled out in the reaction.

I think that if one tries to summarize the characteristics that are being given to our proposals, they can be expressed as follows: First, the novelty of our proposals in all parameters is noted; second, the breadth of their scope; and third, their specific nature. However, it is also being noted that all of the Soviet proposals on disarmament are backed up by far-reaching verification measures and this will make it possible to guarantee observance of accords when they are concluded.

[Kalyagin] I would like to say a few more words about the stance of the United States -- for in many respects whether it will prove possible to reach an agreement on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons depends precisely on them. The U.S. President and the secretary of state came out immediately, as observers say, with considered, positive statements and greeted this step of ours; then a silence set in. This silence is continuing even now. I am getting the impression that U.S. Administration figures would like to calm public opinion with initial statements that do not commit them to anything and then gradually dispose of the matter quietly; give it to experts to study and drag out this study to infinity. What do you think?

[Petrovskiy] You are quite right that the reaction in the United States to our proposals is far from being unequivocal. A different attitude of principle, I would say, emerges on the part of certain U.S. circles to questions of war and peace, precisely in the reaction to our proposal. How are things to be done in the modern nuclear and space age? Are narrow egoistic interests to be placed higher than the interests of the international community, or should one be engaged in joint efforts to build general security and general peace?

I think the watershed of these questions lies between those who take up the stance of political realism and those who cling to the obsolete stereotypes of the past. Certainly, one can assume that a struggle is under way, that discussions are being held on these initiatives. But here, too, I would like to hope that, in the final analysis, good sense and understanding of the fact that, under current conditions, we now need to act together in the name of the main aim -- the elimination of the threat of nuclear war -- will prevail.

[Kalyagin] The Soviet extension of the moratorium on all nuclear tests for another 3 months gave rise to a wide reaction worldwide. Support is growing, including in the United States, from public and political circles for this step. Demonstrations have been stepped up in the United States, with direct calls on the White House to follow the Soviet example and stop nuclear explosions. However, the administration is against this and talks about the need to continue nuclear tests for the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces, which, they say, lag behind the Soviet Union in this sense. They even adduce

the argument that the Soviet Union has completed its planned series of nuclear tests and that it will not be starting the next series earlier than the spring, so the Soviet Union, they say, can wait. Well, what do you have to say on these arguments, Roald Zinnurovich?

[Sagdeyev] Literally the day after our country announced the moratorium, arguments against it appeared overseas. They gave most varied reasons, including an alleged U.S. lag in the sphere of the development and perfection of nuclear weapons. They adduced the arguments that it cannot be verified. One must say that today, in the context of our plan for the global liquidation of nuclear weapons, the freezing of their qualitative standard, i.e., the cessation of all kinds of testing, is the first natural stage. I would even say that this is an essential entrance fee, a fee which our country has boldly, and with a feeling of very great responsibility, paid. The argument on verification [kontrol] has today been virtually removed from the agenda by our opponents because recently, particularly in the statement made by Mikhail Sergeyevich, it was very firmly stated that if any additional methods are needed, we are ready to consider them. There is no problem here. (?Verification is part of the process of a total ban on testing.)

As for the matter of the alleged state of lagging behind, we have to turn to statistics: Statistics on the number of nuclear tests carried out throughout the entire history of the atomic bomb and statistics on the number of nuclear tests in the past year, specifically during the time that followed our proclamation of a moratorium, of course, demonstrate on whose side the truth lies. It can be said that in all, the number of tests carried out in the Soviet Union throughout the whole period in all spheres is approximately 30 percent less than the number of tests carried out in the United States alone. I would like, all the same for this statistical data to become known to the U.S. taxpayer because then perhaps the voice of the electorate will get stronger.

[Chervov] According to the figures of the Swedish Defense Institute, which very scrupulously registers all nuclear explosions, it is now known that as of January 1986 the United States has carried out a total number of nuclear explosions that is greater than all the nuclear powers of the world put together. Here are the figures from the Swedish institute. [Video close-up on screen of a card Chervov is holding] We have shown them on a diagram which we are putting up for television viewers. The facts, as they say, are a stubborn thing. As for the seasonal nature of nuclear tests for the Soviet Union, this, to put it bluntly, an absurd argument. First, you know, we announced the unilateral moratorium in summer, in midsummer we embarked on this, having broken off our own program, and the U.S. side is perfectly aware of this. So it is not a question here of a seasonal nature, it is not a matter of any other arguments; the Americans simply have no arguments now. It must be directly stated that the rejection by the United States of stopping nuclear tests cannot be viewed as anything other than Washington's reluctance to put an end to the nuclear arms race.

[Kalyagin] Could you, by the way, say how many explosions the United States has carried out since we observed the moratorium?

[Chervov] In 1985, the U.S. side carried out 18 nuclear explosions, including nine after the moratorium, which is also shown on our diagram.

[Kalyagin] The so-called Strategic Defense Initiative of President Reagan remains the stumbling block at the Geneva talks on limiting and reducing weapons. The White House clearly does not want to give up this program. It states that SDI allegedly does not

represent a threat to the Soviet Union; that one is talking here not about the offensive, but purely defensive weapons; that they are targeted not against people, but against nuclear missiles only, and even then, only if they are used as a first-strike weapon during the launch. What can one say about that, Nikolay Fedorovich?

[Chervov] The U.S. Administration has been trying for almost 3 years to persuade other states, including its NATO allies, that the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative or "star wars" is useful and even necessary for mankind. Weinberger, the U.S. secretary of defense, even stated that the space means under development are not even weapons, they are merely harmless and inoffensive means. Such statements do not stand up to criticism. The space strike means being created in the United States are weapons and SDI is the transfer of the arms race into space. If SDI is implemented, space weapons will hang over all of mankind like the sword of damocles. The same Weinberger states bluntly, I quote from his statement: If we, i.e. the United States, will be able to obtain a system that will be efficient and will make the Soviet Union's weapons inefficient, we will then be returning to the situation when the United States was the only country with nuclear weapons.

It cannot be expressed more clearly: SDI is the U.S. drive to achieve through space decisive military superiority.

First, the space strike weapons in tandem with the strategic offensive weapons increase an offensive potential and give the offensive potential and the strategic offensive weapons the capability of an unpunished first strike with the purpose of maximally weakening the response strike. Second, the space strike weapons can be used for hitting objects in space, i.e., for sudden destruction of the major space apparatus of the other side with the purpose of blinding, catching it unprepared, and, in this way, undermining it or rendering it fully incapable of countermeasures after a nuclear attack by the other side. Third, the space strike means have a range of 4,000, 5,000 and more kilometers. The question is: What sort of a defensive weapon is it with such a range? It is, in fact a universal weapon.

Such weapons can be used for achieving offensive objectives, in particular, in order to strike from space ground-based objects: airfields, oil stores, power stations, dams, agricultural fields, etc. In the opinion of U.S. scientists, the laser systems being created in accordance with the "star wars" program will be capable of destroying a major city in a matter of several minutes and in several hours, population centers of an entire country. Industrially developed states will be thrown back to the Middle Ages; large-scale fires will be created which will lead to an ecological disaster similar to the nuclear winter. Is it really a defensive weapon?

Furthermore, the space strike weapons are capable of achieving first-strike objectives. They are, according to the Western experts' assertion, capable of destroying missiles in their silos, i.e., putting the enemy's missiles out of action even before they are launched. In a word, not a shield, but a space sword is being created and that is the military essence of SDI or "star wars." The U.S. Administration is projecting only one side of the space strike weapons in its propaganda -- namely, their capability of achieving defensive objectives -- and about the fact that they are intended to strike objects on land, in space, and on the sea, on their capability of achieving offensive objectives, the U.S. Administration keeps silent.

[Kalyagin] There is another such argument in Washington, that SDI is, supposedly, only research and research cannot be monitored or banned, everyone carries out research,

and that this program does not violate the current Soviet-U.S. treaty on limiting anti-missile defenses; hence, it cannot be an obstacle to radical reductions in nuclear missiles.

[Chervov] Work on the SDI program is now proceeding very intensively, especially on the creation of surveillance, tracking, and pointing systems, directed energy weapons, kinetic energy weapons -- mostly earth and space-based antimissile and combat control systems. Most of the aforementioned work is at the stage of experimental development and the creation of demonstration mock-ups and models. These actions contradict the spirit of the ABM Treaty -- Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Some of these actions -- for example, the tests that the United States carried out, -- specifically, the test of an X-ray laser away from testing grounds agreed upon by the ABM Treaty -- are a direct violation of the 1972 treaty. Taking part in the SDI operations are the major military-industrial corporations of the United States, universities, laboratories of leading firms, and private research organizations.

Is it conceivable that the United States would spend \$26 billion on research -- they are planning for 5 years -- and then suddenly renounce the idea of "star wars," put a stop to it simply because the Russians won't agree to its deployment? You will recall that the United States spent \$15 billion on the Manhattan Project for the creation of nuclear weapons. For this reason it is laughable to even think that \$26 billion are needed merely to resolve a theoretical question of whether it is possible or impossible to create offensive space weapons. The same Weinberger on this score rudely pushes Mother Truth aside, as they say. He has stated directly that "I exclude the possibility of renouncing the Strategic Defense Initiative, both in the research stage and in the deployment stage."

Meanwhile, a radical reduction in nuclear arms is impossible without a ban on offensive space weapons. On the contrary, it would be necessary to develop and improve them. The Soviet Union and the United States understood this truth splendidly in the 1970's. Now the U.S. Administration is denying it.

[Kalayagin] Certain figures in the West are saying that, well, if the U.S. President and the U.S. Administration want to create an antimissile space shield so much -- and I am using their terminology, although it is of course, an offensive weapon -- then why not do this. The United States would create its space shield. There would be two shields. There would be a certain balance and this way it would be possible to combine both Reagan's SDI and the Soviet peace program for the elimination of nuclear weapons. What do you think about such arguments?

[Chervov] Such arguments...even if you can imagine space shields being created simultaneously in the United States and the Soviet Union, it would be a very, very unstable, a critical situation. This idea consists of the following: If one side deploys offensive and defensive systems and the other side has only offensive systems, then the first side acquires a significant strategic superiority. It acquires the possibility of inflicting a disarming nuclear strike. In such a situation, nothing is left for the second side to do other than develop its strategic offensive weapons. In such a situation, the reduction of strategic offensive weapons loses its meaning. However, in the case of both sides having offensive and defensive systems, that is, space shields ago, it would also become worse than if the sides had only offensive weapons. Calculations show that even an insignificant, minor advantage by one of the sides in the effectiveness of its space shield, in the effectiveness of its defensive systems would immediately destabilize the whole situation. Such a situation would also be preserved in the case of both sides reducing their nuclear armaments, since, in

this situation, nuclear weapons would no longer have an influence on the situation and the strategic situation would be dictated by space shields. Strategic weapons would no longer be able to guarantee the security of each of the sides, especially when one of the sides clearly wants to acquire an advantage in defensive systems, in a space shield as the result of technology, such as the United States is striving for now.

[Kalyagin] So there would be a complete destabilization of the situation, it seems?

[Chervov] At his press conference in Geneva, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev cited an original example of the situation of both sides having space shields. I shall permit myself to cite this example. Let's imagine what consequences would be brought by even an accidental collision in space. Let's say something falls off a rocket; the warhead part, so to speak, goes its way, while the carrier part falls away and crashes into some group belonging to this space weaponry. All the computers go into action, while the politicians cannot do anything sensible at all in this instance. Well, are we to find ourselves in the power of these events?

[Kalyagin] Apropos the recent tragedy that destroyed the American Challenger spacecraft; evidently, this provides additional material for some kind of reflection.

[Chervov] Yes, for if this tragic event had occurred when both sides had space shields, then the computers of the U.S. space shield would have gone into action immediately. And how would that have ended up? In conclusion on this issue, I would like to stress the following: The joint deployment of space shields is a false road which creates the illusion of strengthening the security of the sides, but which in fact undermines it.

[Sagdeyev] Sometimes the supporters of SDI try to persuade everyone. They say let's undertake research, and then development, and even if nothing comes of it, there will be some other, useful outcome; it might be commercial, it might be in civil technologies.

This kind of spinoff has come to be called a by-product in English. If we now come back to the question of the reliability of two mirror image space shields, what can be said? As Nikolay Fedorovich has already mentioned, the firepower of each of the shields is so great that, first of all, one is struck by the by-product in this sphere: It turns out that in order to destroy a mirror image space shield of the opposing side according to a prepared scenario and in a very short time, one need only expend one tenth of the firepower of one's own shield, as the calculations show. Thus, regardless of who invested the technology and funds in deploying the shield, whether it is thanks to one's own national resources or whether it has been done thanks to a generous gift from the other side -- as you know, there have been proposals to share technology of late...

[Kalyagin interrupting] True, and the Americans don't even offer this to their Western partners.

[Chervov] And Weinberger said that the technology might be shared when the Americans have already created their shield.

[Sagdeyev] Well, in a matter of seconds, this precious gift will be destroyed. Thanks very much, I'm sure! So far, one cannot see any other by-product here. And really, can one seriously think that such hypertrophied lasers being made with the intention

of attacking and destroying targets at a distance of several thousand kilometers will be able to find some sensible application in medicine? For delicate surgery, or for process operations in industry? The same applies to the completely hypertrophied, distorted types of computer systems spoken of in the context of the SDI program. I agree completely with Nikolay Fedorovich, that guaranteeing reliability of such a very complex, super-complex system, on a purely technological level, represents an exceptionally complex, problematical and, I would say, simply impossible task.

Getting away from the space technology, the flying devices, and looking at the reliability of the computer system which the SDI supporters expect to build, what are we discussing? It has to be a computer system holding in its memory, in its programs, instructions and codes put there beforehand telling it how the system has to act in case of this or that situation arising. Well, the situation here is extremely complicated, it means tens of thousands, or, taking decoys into account, even hundreds of thousands of bodies flying through space. And so it turns out that the size of the programs, the quantity of these instructions, has to be reckoned in tens of millions of lines. It is not possible to create a faultless set of commands in advance; in situ tests are required. I think everyone would like to avoid such global in situ tests which would turn not just into a tragedy such as that of Challenger, but a tragedy many times greater.

[Kalyagin] Since we are now studying the question of the consequences of implementing the SDI program in such detail, I want to quote another argument which the U.S. President himself expressed. He produced the following justification on the space score: In conversation with Soviet journalists he said, I quote, that it is possible that a situation may arise where somewhere in the world some madman will try once again to create nuclear offensive weapons in order to use them for blackmail. In that event, the existence of an antimissile space shield will allow us all to rest easy. What do you think of such an unexpected argument?

[Sagdeyev] If one considers the volume of material expenditure and the quantity of equipment, the most complex equipment which may also have the ability to make a first strike, I think you'll get tens of thousands, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of metric tons of most complex equipment only in orbit, in space. All that against one madman who will most probably choose another method -- a fishing boat or simply a truck.

[Kalyagin] One could dream up dozens of such circumstances for justification. For example, they talk of aliens from other worlds... But let us return to our peace initiatives. The first stage of the Soviet program for nuclear disarmament concerns first and foremost the Soviet Union and the United States. In what form and when would it be desirable to get the other nuclear powers to join them. What do you think, Vladimir Fedorovich?

[Petrovskiy] You were quite right to note that the first stage basically concerns the Soviet Union and the United States. At the same time, in our program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the beginning of the third millennium there is set out a minutely elaborated and, I would say, considered order or bringing the other nuclear states into the process of nuclear disarmament. In this matter we also took account of the wishes and feelings in these states. After all, as is known, the leaders of Britain, France, and China have declared on more than one occasion that their countries will be ready to take part in nuclear disarmament at a time when the Soviet Union and the United States substantially reduce their arsenals.

Precisely taking those circumstance into account, our program indeed proposes that the remaining nuclear powers should start reducing their nuclear weapons at the second stage of the program, which will start in 1990, after the United States and the Soviet Union have reduced -- and reduced not only substantially, but by half -- their strategic and other nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territory. It is also a matter of appropriate mechanisms, say for achieving Soviet-U.S. accord on such a reduction. It is entirely reasonable to make use of the already existing mechanism of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons which are being conducted in Geneva. Later on, probably, as other nuclear states join in nuclear disarmament, it is not ruled out that the need will arise for some other forums.

[Chervov] I wanted to add two words.

[Kalyagin] Fine, of course.

[Chervov] Concerning the other nuclear powers: They reduce their nuclear weapons at the second stage -- only tactical nuclear weapons, only tactical, with a range not above 1,000 km or less, while the nuclear weapons which they call strategic will start to be reduced at the third stage, in effect starting from 1995. Therein lies the fundamental special nature of the Soviet program for nuclear disarmament, that it does not affect, does not damage the security interests of other states.

[Kalyagin] In the West, voices are also being heard saying that your proposals for a full elimination of nuclear weapons hide a secret trap -- that if all nuclear weapons are destroyed, so it goes, then the Soviet Union will obtain superiority for conventional weapons. This is especially frequently said in the context of Europe. How do you see it?

[Chervov] Boris Aleksandrovich, this is not a new question. There is no superiority in conventional weapons on the side of the Warsaw Pact. In the first place, the NATO countries have more, almost 500,000 more numbers of Armed Forces. The population of the NATO countries is half as big again as that of the Warsaw Pact, and this means that in reserve contingents the superiority is clearly on the side of NATO. The production capacities of NATO's military industry is considerably greater than that of the Warsaw Pact. NATO has more tactical nuclear weapons. NATO has at its disposal colossal conventional armed forces, possessing a considerable superiority over the Warsaw Pact in a whole range of weapons and means. I shall quote you some examples. Take, for example, the number of combat-ready divisions, which are immediately ready for military actions without being deployed. In Europe NATO has 94 combat-ready divisions, counting France and Spain. The Warsaw Pact has 78 divisions.

The number of U.S. divisions deployed is approximately 19,000 men; FRG divisions, on the order of 24,000; the divisions of the Warsaw Pact number about 11-12,000 men. There is a clear superiority on the side of NATO for combat-ready divisions.

But the NATO people never do cite this example. They fail to mention it, because it is disadvantageous for them to speak of it. They overemphasize and usually inflate the issue about tanks. What is this about? When it is to their advantage, U.S. and NATO leaders count up only those tanks that are at the disposal of the united NATO command, that is, at the disposal of Rogers, and give a figure now of 16,000-18,000 although in point of fact Rogers has more than 20,000 tanks. These are just the ones at the disposal of the NATO command. Apart from this, however, there are around 2,500 U.S.

tanks concentrated at depots in Europe. These are for dual-based formations -- the personnel are deployed and the weapons are kept in storage. Apart from this, there are nearly 6,000 tanks for the armed forces of West European countries. That is to say, that NATO is not inferior to the Warsaw Pact in the overall number of tanks. NATO is superior to the Warsaw Pact in antitank weapons. The amount of artillery it has is approximately equal to the Warsaw Pact's. It is true that NATO is somewhat inferior to the Warsaw Pact in the number of tactical air force craft.

On the whole, we believe there is an approximate balance in conventional arms. The London Strategic Studies Institute -- which can in no way be considered pro-Soviet -- came to the following conclusion for 1985 after profound analysis: In conventional arms, the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- this is noted in the institute's studies -- is, as before, such that it renders a military offensive a very risky undertaking, since neither of the sides has at its disposal the combined might to guarantee victory. Besides, as you know, the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev openly says that, along with the removal of mass destruction weapons from states' arsenals, the Soviet Union is proposing that conventional arms and armed forces should become the subject of agreed reductions. An accord at the Vienna talks could become the signal for the start of movement in this direction. Thus, the Soviet proposal for eliminating nuclear weapons does not contain any hidden obstacles as regards Europe.

[Petrovskiy] Boris Aleksandrovich, I would also like to turn attention to the diplomatic side of this matter. In NATO countries at present noise is beginning to be made about conventional arms. In fact, however, these countries are doing nothing toward putting into action the process of reducing conventional arms and armed forces. Nikolay Fedorovich has just mentioned the proposals that have been made many times by Warsaw Pact states on limiting and reducing conventional arms. However, we have not as yet received a reply to these proposals. What's more, I will say, this is what they are saying about conventional arms, the conventional arms in central Europe, at the talks which deal with the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms precisely in the center of Europe: At the talks in Vienna the Western participants are refusing to talk about reducing arms, although the reduction of arms is also the subject of an agreed accord...

[Chervov, interjecting] ...and the mandate of the Vienna talks.

[Petrovskiy] And the mandate, definitely the mandate, you are quite right. Or here is a final example. On many occasions, the UN General Assembly has demanded that a convention banning or limiting the use of certain specific types of conventional weapons which can be considered detrimental, but put into action, should enter into force. And why has this convention not entered into force? Only because, despite the insistent calls by the United Nations, NATO countries are still stubbornly refusing to ratify this convention. Here, as they say, this speaks for itself from the diplomatic point of view.

[Kalyagin] It's generally accepted that questions of disarmament and arms reduction are key issues in Soviet-U.S. relations. The improvement of our bilateral links depends on them in many respects. Certain U.S. observers also point to a reverse dependence: the improvement of bilateral links may result in the growth of trust and facilitate the solution of security problems. In this connection, I would like to ask, what further steps can be taken by our countries to expand Soviet-U.S. bilateral relations.

[Petrovskiy] Boris Aleksandrovich, I would like to say first and foremost that you are quite right. Indeed, questions of security and, first and foremost, of the

reduction of arms -- which is the main road to security -- really are key issues in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. And strictly speaking, this conception has been reflected in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement.

Incidentally, when President Reagan himself was speaking, touching on the most important questions of our century, he brought precisely the reduction of the enormous nuclear arsenals of the two sides, the Soviet Union and the United States that is, to the forefront. True, it must be said that he spoke about this without any connection to a ban on space arms. And we proceed from the fact that the full realization of the accords reached in Geneva -- and in other directions of Soviet-U.S. cooperation such as agreement about exchanges and contacts in the spheres of science, education, and culture -- would, of course, be much easier in conditions where questions of security begin to be resolved. But such accords would indubitably serve as a good basis for raising the level of trust between our countries.

[Sagdeyev] Of the whole range of possibilities for strengthening and developing bilateral relations -- trade, cultural exchange -- scientific exchange is the one closest to me. I would like to say that this sphere could open up for us absolutely vast prospects; for instead of space militarization, the two countries could do a very great deal together in space for peaceful purposes. It would be possible to organize big space projects -- not only space projects, but earthly ones too -- directed toward solving very important ecological problems -- problems of studying the world's oceans and the preservation of the world's oceans, problems of long-distance space flights. Incidentally, a whole group of my U.S. colleagues actively advocate the direction of efforts in space precisely along peaceful lines, specifically proposing even such an outstanding project as a joint manned flight to Mars. That, of course, is not a matter for tomorrow, but why should we not begin to move with specific, albeit not very big, steps? The accord that was reached at the summit in Geneva to maintain worldwide efforts in thermonuclear power engineering, to propose that other countries take part in the international project for the development of the Tokamak device for a new generation of thermonuclear power engineering is already one weighty step.

The accords on the exchange of mathematical programs for school computers are interesting, because it happens that precisely now, during the present years, intensive computerization of school education is being carried out, both there and with us. These contacts would draw the younger generation, the schoolchildren, those who will have to carry on building and taking care of our big planet, into a sphere conducive to friendly relations.

[Kalyagin] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement proposes also putting a ban on the creation of a new kind of non-nuclear weapons based on new principles of physics in the process of liquidation of nuclear weapons. Nikolay Fedorovich, could you tell us in more detail what the new kind of weapons are and whether the Strategic Defense Initiative envisages the creation of such a weapon?

[Chervov] Non-nuclear weapons based on new principles of physics are the kind of weapon that uses principles of physics that have not previously been applied to strike at people and other targets.

It is no less dangerous in its strike capabilities than nuclear, or, say, chemical weapons. The Soviet Union believes it essential to establish a ban on their development. At the present time it would be possible to include the following among such weapons: beam weapons, based on the use of a powerful quantum, photon, or electromagnetic radiation flux; a flow of charged or neutral particles, electrons, protons, neutral atoms to hit biological and other targets. Laser and accelerator weapons are a variety of beam weapons: a flow of elementary particles accelerated to relativistic speeds, or up to the speed of light. Laser and accelerator weapons are an integral part of the SDI program. Laser weapons are the heart of "star wars."

Among the new kinds of weapons based on new principles of physics are radio wave weapons, based on the effect of electromagnetic modes in the radio wave spectrum on people, as well as on weapons and equipment. Infra-sound weapons. This is a weapon based on the use of guided radiation from powerful infrasound generators to act on the living organism. This effect happens through the acoustic resonance of extremely low -- and low audio frequencies in the human body.

Genetic weapons are based on the effect of new or hybrid biological agents on living organisms. These are pathogens of diseases which are obtained not by the usual traditional methods, but by methods of molecular biology and genetic engineering. A variety of genetic weapons are ethnic weapons, chemical or biological, for selective attack against individual ethnic groups of a population. According to data in the foreign press, special genetic laboratories, which exist in the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, and Japan, are working on the development of formulations for such pathogens.

[Unidentified voice] A threat to whole peoples arises.

[Chervov] Yes, exactly.

[Kalyagin] Some observers are putting this sort of question at the moment: What if, after all, it should not prove possible to convince the present Washington administration? If they should begin to implement its programme, what will the Soviet Union's reply be? How will our country act?

[Sagdeyev] I think that, overall, of course, the security of the whole world, the security not only of our country, but of the United States itself, will be fundamentally undermined by such a step if it is taken. But for the restoration of strategic balance, for the restoration of parity, steps in response will undoubtedly be taken. There are many possibilities. We have already spoken today about how dangerous and unstable the balance would become if a mirror, symmetric space shield system should come about. Other measures also exist; considerably more effective measures, more simple and cheap. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke about this in particular at the press conference in Geneva after the completion of the meeting with the Americans. But among specific measures I could name some of those which were the object of analysis by broad circles of the international scientific public within the framework of the antiwar movement. These are measures of counteraction, based on giving offensive weapons more tenacity, the capability of penetrating space shields; measures of an active nature, which would exploit the extreme vulnerability of the space echelons of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. Well, I don't think that this question -- discussion of this question -- should be forced, because there remains time to take a reasonable and sober decision. Our proposals have now been laid on the table.

[Kalyagin] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke of the need for new thinking in the policies of states. He even called inertness of thought, its lagging behind the quickly changing world, one of the real obstacles on the road to radical disarmament.

In connection with this I would like to draw your attention to the fact that certain figures in the West have started to talk about the utopian nature of the Soviet program, saying that it is hardly feasible in practice. In the past, they say, plans of this type for all-embracing disarmament have already been discussed, and every time they failed to lead to success because of their integrated nature. Are their arguments of this type simply an indication that certain figures in the West do not wish to part with old forms of thinking?

[Petrovskiy] Well, I will begin with the fact that in the past, in the history of disarmament talks, there was never any program of such a type. The program for the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of our millennium, put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, is unprecedented in diplomatic and political history. This program is distinguished not only by its comprehensive character, but by profound study of all details, by its specific character. You are perfectly right about those who speak about the utopian nature of this program; they are continuing to think in the categories of the past, pre-nuclear era, when it was thought by some people -- and on the whole this point of view was current both in political and in military theory -- that security must be secured with the help of military force.

Our nuclear and space era has completely overturned these notions. The point is that the current period in the development of international relations is characterized by the fact that such weapons have been created which can lead mankind to self-destruction. At the same time, on a vast scale, the mutual dependence, mutual connections of states has grown, states which continue to retain their own interests, their own policies, their own traditions. Not to see these new realities, to approach the solution of the problems which are arising with old standards -- I think that this is now not only unwise, but also extremely dangerous. Precisely for this reason a new approach is necessary, a fresh view of many things in foreign policy. Here, I think the determination of approach to the issues of security gains central significance.

Security in the nuclear and space era -- this is actually recognized by all realistically thinking politicians, regardless of their political and ideological views. It is recognized by them all that security in our nuclear and space age can only be security for all. It is impossible to strengthen one's own security at the expense of the security of others.

[Kalyagin] And Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has even said that we are against damaging the security of the United States, that this is counter to our interests.

[Petrovskiy] Quite right, because this would only, so to say, worsen the overall situation, it would cause suspicion concerning actions. Finally, I think that the new mentality we are talking about has to presuppose real readiness; not readiness in words to put an end to the arms race and to strive for ridding the world of the danger of nuclear self-annihilation or any other self-annihilation. I think that today's philosophy of survival should be supplemented by actions. Now is a time when immediate action is required, action by all and everyone, in order not only for the new concept of security in the nuclear and space era to be asserted, but also in order that it be embodied in specific deeds.

[Kalyagin] Our new peace program is itself, in essence, a model of the new character of thinking of today's world. It opens up fresh horizons, new spheres of activity for mankind. Let us hope that the United States will take advantage of this unique, historic opportunity and go its half of the way to eliminate forever the nuclear threat hanging over mankind.

Here I think we will end our program. Thank you for taking part, and thanks to the viewers for their attention.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS: ACDA REPORT 'LATEST STAGE' IN U.S. PROPAGANDA

LDO21251 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1110 GMT 2 Feb 86

[Text] Washington, 2 Feb (TASS) -- The White House has announced that President Reagan has sent the regular annual Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report to Congress.

The report itself has not been put out yet. Although, to judge by the accompanying letters of the President to congressmen and leaders of the House of Representatives and Senate, which have been published, this document is in fact an ode praising the United States for their ostensible "full adherence" to their pledges in the field of arms control and at the same time -- a list of accusation in respect to other countries, including the Soviet Union.

One notices the fact that precisely the part of the report which contains the absurd "accusations," is strictly classified. This very fact alone shows that the United States has no facts at its disposal, because there can be none. On the contrary, it is known that in the course of various hearings in Congress, a number of quite influential experts declared that the Soviet Union adhered to her treaty obligations in the field of arms control. The same has been admitted by U.S. representatives at sittings of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission, which was established to monitor accords concluded by the sides. It is not the United States, but the Soviet Union, which has every reason to pose the question of adherence by the U.S. side to its obligations.

In his letter to Congress, Reagan asserts that he takes the obligations adopted by the United States as a result of the talks between the Soviet minister of foreign affairs and the U.S. secretary of state in January, 1985, in Geneva, "very seriously."

At that time the sides agreed they would strive to end the arms race on earth and prevent one in space. Now, however, by sending this report to Congress, the President is in fact placing his "Strategic Defense Initiative," which threatens to extend the arms race into space, outside the framework of the accord. Moreover, in direct violation of the indefinite Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of antimissile defense systems Washington has announced its program to create antimissile defense territories in the United States and its NATO allies; the program will include prohibited elements to be based in space.

Not having ratified the SALT II treaty, the United States, however, gave the assurance that it intended to adhere to its clauses. Nevertheless, in violation of the provisions of this important document the United States has begun production of long-range cruise

missiles to based on land and at sea and has begun their mass deployment. The siting [razmeshcheniye] then of the new ballistic missiles in Western Europe is an open violation of Clause 12 of the SALT II treaty. It remains to be added that the United States stubbornly refuses to ratify the treaties on underground nuclear explosions of 1974-1976 and has violated them more than once.

The appearance of the presidential report is seen by observers as the latest stage in a propaganda campaign, which is supposed to draw the attention of the U.S. and international public away from the U.S. violations of its treaty obligations.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET STAND ON ARMS VERIFICATION EXPLAINED

PM281904 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Jan 86 First Edition p 5

[A. Mozgovoy article: "A Barrier Against Nuclear Death Into the 21st Century -- Without Weapons!"]

[Text] Many words, a great deal of time, and a lot of paper have been wasted by politicians and propagandists in the United States and other NATO states to blow up the issue of the difficulties of monitoring [kontrol] the observance of arms limitation agreements. Every time the Soviet Union has put forward constructive peace-loving initiatives, the problem of the verification [proverka] of treaty obligations has immediately surfaced. Matters have been presented as if the Soviet Union is a vehement opponent of comprehensive monitoring [kontrol]."

Of course, such claims are totally divorced from reality. Our country has always been and remains an advocate of reliable verification [kontrol]. But we approach this problem objectively; not as part of general declarations. After all, every avenue of arms limitation and reduction demands its own particular inspections and its own specific methods and means for their implementation; in other words, verification [kontrol] must match the volume and nature of the obligations that are undertaken. Observance of the implementation of agreements and treaties must be built on the principle of equal security and nondetriment to any side.

The term "arms control [kontrol]" instead of "disarmament verification [kontrol]" has become established in the United States. This is, of course, not without purpose. In the West the substance of the question is in fact often reduced to gaining an opportunity for spying on the structure and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is obvious Soviet Union cannot agree to such "control [kontrol]."

Suddenly and recently, however, Washington and other NATO capitals have been playing up the problem of monitoring [kontrol] less and less frequently and are now trying to avoid it altogether. What has happened?

In a number of his latest statements, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev repeatedly turned to the subject of disarmament verification [kontrol]. Our country's views on this issue are stated most fully and comprehensively in the statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This most important political document makes it obvious that verification [kontrol] is no problem for the Soviet Union.

In the first place, the Soviet measures apply to nuclear arms, which it is proposed to completely eliminate by the end of 1999. The verification [proverka] of arms limita-

tion and destruction at each stage must be effected both by national technical means and by on-site inspections. The Soviet Union is prepared to seek agreement on any other additional verification [kontrol] measures.

Existing national means of observation, including satellites and seismological, radar, and other radioelectronic stations, are highly effective.

According to research carried out by associates of the prestigious U.S. Center for Defense Information, they are capable of effecting practically 100-percent verification [proverka] in such spheres as tracking nuclear explosions; tests and deployment of ballistic missiles; construction, tests, and deployment of nuclear-capable aircraft and submarines; and tests of space weapons. In fact, satellites now make it possible to read the license plates on motor vehicles, while the observation of what is being done with massive strategic complexes is even less of a problem.

In accordance with the Soviet disarmament program, both nuclear charges and the means for their delivery must be subject to destruction. Some types of delivery vehicles are obviously capable of being converted; for the purposes of geophysical and space research, for example. So, recourse may be had to on-site inspections and to international verification [kontrol] measures as regards the observance of complex procedures in the destruction of nuclear combat ammunition and the dismantling, liquidation, or conversion of delivery vehicles.

After completion of the third stage, when there are no more nuclear weapons on earth, all countries will draw up a universal accord -- verifiable by means of joint efforts, of course -- in order to prevent these weapons from ever being brought back again. "And so we propose," the statement emphasizes, "to enter the third millennium without nuclear weapons on the basis of mutually acceptable and strictly verifiable accords."

In order to achieve this aim, we must, above all, block all channels of improving nuclear weapons. This is a priority task. The reduction of strategic arsenals without banning nuclear tests is no solution to the dilemma of the threat of thermonuclear war because the remaining weapons could be modernized and the likelihood of the creation [sozdaniye] of increasingly lethal and sophisticated weapons (neutron or X-ray laser type weapons) would remain. In other words, ending tests is an essential practical step toward the elimination of nuclear arms. The introduction of a comprehensive moratorium would also provide a reliable machinery for verifying [kontrol] nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union favors the intensification of talks on concluding an effective and verifiable international convention on banning chemical weapons and destroying existing stockpiles of these weapons.

At the Vienna talks on armed force and limitation and reduction in Central Europe, NATO representatives are citing the same old problem of verification [kontrol] as the main obstacle preventing achievement of an agreement. However, the Warsaw Pact countries are no less interested in proper verification [proverka]. The Soviet leader's statement points out that a possible accord would, naturally, require sensible verification [kontrol]. This implies, in addition to national technical means, exchanges of the musters of military units subject to reduction and reciprocal notification of the beginning and completion of the process of reduction. It is also envisaged that each side would establish three or four observation posts for the duration of the withdrawal. Permanently manned verification [kontrol] posts would monitor the entry and exit of all military contingents to and from the reduction zone.

The Soviet program for disarmament and verification [kontrol] is not to the detriment of any side. The stance taken by the United States and its NATO allies was quite different, at least until quite recently. The United States also allegedly favors verification [kontrol]. It has proposed, for instance, inviting Soviet representatives to attend nuclear tests. But for what purpose? In order to condone the process of improving nuclear arsenals by their presence, perhaps? It is also talking about the desirability of providing "free access" to laboratories engaged in space technology research. Yes, we favor such inspections [proverka].

However, as M.S. Gorbachev has noted, if "laboratories are to be opened up, then it must be solely for purposes of verifying [kontrol] the ban on the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons and by no means in order to legalize them."

Strict and reliable verification [kontrol] of the process of disarmament rather than of the arms race, this is the essence of the Soviet Union's stance. This approach opens up broad prospects for strengthening security and establishing firm trust between states.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS OBSERVER BOGACHEV VIEWS U.S. DRAFT MILITARY BUDGET

LD051525 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1428 GMT 5 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, 5 Feb (TASS) -- TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev writes:

In his address at a Washington press conference marking the publication of the U.S. draft military budget for the financial year 1986, Caspar Weinberger, the defense secretary, asserted that allegedly the only way to hold talks with the Soviet Union on arms reduction is for the United States to increase its production of armaments.

Ignoring U.S. obligations, including those adopted in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement of 8 January 1985, the Pentagon chief has demanded the allocation of extra funds for the deployment of these very weapons systems whose reduction should be the final aim of the Geneva talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. So Weinberger insisted on building 100 new MX MIRV intercontinental ballistic missiles instead of the 50 permitted by Congress and on financing the construction of another "Trident" submarine with 24 missiles carrying 192 individually targeted nuclear warheads.

The deployment of these nuclear weapons, along with everything else, will result in the United States exceeding the limit for strategic delivery vehicles with separately targeted warheads which was laid down by the SALT II treaty. Thus, Weinberger has graphically demonstrated yet again what the recent White House statements on U.S. willingness to observe the provisions of this Soviet-U.S. agreement are worth.

The draft of the new U.S. budget envisions allocations for the siting of additional cruise missiles in Western Europe. The medium-range nuclear missiles of both sides are also the subject of the Geneva talks. There is every reason to consider the proposed inclusion in the U.S. military budget of allocations for the siting of additional cruise missiles as an obstructionist reaction by Washington to the Soviet proposal to eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in the European theater as the first step on the way to freeing the European Continent of nuclear weapons.

While cutting virtually all civilian and social programs, the U.S. Administration intends significantly to increase in the 1987 fiscal year its expenditure on preparations for "star wars". The U.S. press is paying attention to the fact that Washington has been forced to resort to deceiving U.S. public opinion in the conditions of the huge U.S. budget deficit by lowering the true growth in U.S. military expenditure through juggling and manipulations.

An initial familiarization with the U.S. draft military budget leads one to think that present U.S. Administration has taken a course toward an unrestrained increase in the arms race in the last 2 years of its term in power in order to render it irreversible and make it impossible for its successors to adopt any measures to reduce the level of military confrontation by means of accords and agreements.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SEMEYKO ARTICLES EXPLORE U.S. DISARMAMENT ATTITUDES

U.S. Nuclear Strategy

PM241631 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jan 86 First Edition p 3

[Article by L. Semeyko under the rubric "Whence the Threat to Peace": "At the Danger Line"; first two paragraphs are paper's introduction]

[Excerpts] "The citadel of international reaction is U.S. imperialism," the draft new edition of the CPSU Program says. "It is the primary source of the threat of war." Hatching dangerous militarist plans, Washington is continuing its pursuit of the impossible dream of military superiority. As CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's statement says, "actions are being taken which are clearly intended to arouse hostility and distrust and revive the antithesis of detente -- a confrontation situation."

Today we are publishing the first in a series of articles dealing with problems on whose solution the fate of peace depends.

The enormous destructive power of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons gave rise among the militarist circles of U.S. imperialism to the desire to acquire the capability to totally neutralize [obezoruzhivaniye] the other side. Recent decades have seen an emphasis on the massive creation of highly accurate missiles. But it is becoming increasingly obvious to the makers of transatlantic military policy and strategy that the creation of strategic offensive armaments alone cannot solve the task of neutralization [obezoruzhivaniye], that is, acquiring military superiority. This also gave rise to a quest for new strategic military and technical military options.

Furthermore, rapid progress in the technical military sphere in the past four decades has also led to the objective conclusion that it is necessary to eliminate that which was thereby created through the political will of the imperialist forces and to which the Soviet side has adopted -- solely for defensive purposes -- effective retaliatory measures. Despite all the differences between the approaches of the Soviet Union and the United States, of East and West, the process of curbing the nuclear arms race became not only necessary, but possible. It has taken place in difficult conditions, with its ups and down, but it has been possible and it remains possible today, as long as the U.S. side does not cross the new -- nuclear-space -- Rubicon.

The possibility was also stated at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva, although the meeting failed to find solutions to the very important questions pertaining to the task of halting the arms race and strengthening peace.

Practical ways to solve this problem of great importance to the future of mankind were clearly defined in the statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev. This impressive document sets out a concrete program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide in the 15 years that remain before the beginning of the third millennium. The new Soviet initiatives, which meet the aspirations of all peoples, aroused enormous interest all over the world.

But there are influential forces in the United States who are continuing to advocate the militarization of space, which would radically alter the military political situation in the world.

The danger of mutual nuclear destruction would be greatly magnified. The most aggressive and adventurist forces of U.S. imperialism might consider it permissible to have not only local, small wars, but a global nuclear missile war involving the total utilization of accumulated nuclear arsenals. This approach would be based on the idea -- as illusory as it is fatal -- of "at last" having acquired an opportunity to deliver a neutralizing strike with impunity. It would combine the utilization of strategic offensive armaments and strike weapons created on the basis of the latest technical military achievements and deployed in space. Such shifts in strategic thinking would have not just far-reaching, but absolutely fatal consequences.

On the political plane it would undermine the possibility of establishing normal, stable relations between the Soviet Union and the United States based on maximum mutual trust. A U.S. refusal to seek constructive solutions to problems of war and peace -- and these solutions must ensure real mutual survival in the nuclear age, not a "balance of terror," (ever increasing terror, what is more) -- such a refusal would be bound to increase international tension. It would call into question the very possibility of a large-scale reduction of nuclear armaments and this would adversely affect the entire disarmament process -- in all spheres. Reducing its strategic nuclear potential in a situation where the United States was countering it with an antimissile shield would mean, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, consciously agreeing to reduce its own nuclear retaliation potential.

In the strategic military plane U.S. acknowledgment of the inevitability of mutual destruction as a result of a nuclear war would be replaced by a gamble on the possibility of one-sided destruction. It could ensure, they say, after the Soviet Union, having been "neutralized" by a first strike, refuses to surrender to the United States, which still has an unused strategic nuclear reserve. Such a gamble would radically undermine existing strategic stability.

In the technical-military sphere the start of the militarization of space would mark the start of unbridled competition in the development [sozdaniye] of modern and ultra-modern strategic weapons, including space strike weapons. The development [sozdaniye] and deployment of the U.S. antimissile shield weapons would immediately give rise to the development [sozdaniye] of weapons to neutralize it in order to preserve the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike and prevent the United States from undermining the strategic military balance. The United States would then take new steps to implement its aggressive designs. All this would whip up the arms race both in space and on earth.

The Soviet Union is issuing a warning: The danger line, beyond which mankind can expect terrible and irreversible consequences, must not be crossed. It is necessary, first of all, to renounce plans for the militarization of space. This would pave the way for the

elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. As M.S. Gorbachev's statement says, "one must enter the third millennium not with a 'star wars' program, but with large-scale projects for the peaceful exploration of space through the efforts of all mankind."

But in the higher reaches of power in the United States it looks as if they have not heeded the voice of reason. It is apparent from Defense Secretary C. Weinberger's statement that the Pentagon does not intend to abandon its "star wars" plans. Not crossing the danger line also means renouncing plans for the development [sozdaniye] of brand-new nuclear armaments. The importance of such a renunciation is in no way diminished in a situation where main attention is focused on preventing the militarization of space.

The Soviet Union has once again demonstrated its willingness to do all it can to improve the international situation, eliminate the threat of nuclear war, and provide reliable security for present and future generations. It is now up to the United States.

U.S. Nuclear 'Adventurism'

PM271158 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 86 First Edition p 3

[L. Semeyko article under the "Whence the Threat to Peace" rubric: "Policy of Military Adventurism"]

[Text] Averting the threat of nuclear war and preventing the irremediable is now the central political task. It must be resolved by common efforts, without delay, and with exceptional responsibility. "The Soviet Union," M.S. Gorbachev pointed out, "proceeds in its policy on the basis that in the nuclear age people on earth are in the same boat. And rocking that boat with military adventurism is an extremely irresponsible act. Life itself rejects political levity these days."

A different approach to this most important of problems is characteristic of U.S. ruling circles, whose policy -- if we proceed on the basis of practice, rather than rhetorical statements -- is imbued with military adventurism. It is multifaceted. It includes gambling on gaining military supremacy, aspirations for global imperial, military space ambitions, and, judging by all this, a still-present faith in the possibility of winning a nuclear clash. It includes military-political adventurism which, on the one hand, is based on the illusion of military and technical superiority, and on the other, forms the basis of the continuous new U.S. ventures in the arms race. What is the essence and particular danger of this approach?

As is well known, science and technology by themselves do not pose a threat to peace. The threat is posed by imperialism and its policy -- a policy of the most reactionary militarist and aggressive forces of the day. The way in which scientific and technical achievements are used -- in the interests of peace or war -- ultimately depends on politicians' attitudes to the problems of war and peace. From this standpoint, the results of the first 40 nuclear years attest to the fact that the United States has invariably pursued a policy of military-political and military-technical adventurism.

The adventurism of the entire U.S. postwar (and particularly, current) military-technical policy lies in its thrust. First, it is seen in the continuous absolutism

[absolyutizatsiya] of arms. Second, it is seen in the orientation toward offensive military-strategic goals and third, in the unswerving gamble on military-technical superiority.

Adventurism of the first designation has been and continues to be to irresponsibly ignore the obvious fact that in the nuclear age security cannot be ensured through military-technical means. Ensuring security is, first and foremost, a political task.

Adventurism of the second designation is that in the nuclear age an offensive and aggressive strategy is shortsighted and suicidal, it leads unambiguously to catastrophe. However, the creators of this strategy were hypnotized by the desire to ensure the "guaranteed destruction" of the Soviet Union through the creation of almost 30,000 diverse nuclear charges and thousands of delivery means.

And adventurism of the third designation has been expressed (and will always be expressed) in the fact that it is senseless, useless, and extremely dangerous to strive for military superiority over the Soviet Union.

However, the forces of militarism and aggression in the United States underestimate the Soviet potential and clearly overestimate the scope of U.S. military, industrial, scientific, and technological potential. They believe this potential can provide them with military superiority in the future, just as -- in their opinion -- it once did in the past.

But this has always led to a kind of boomerang effect. In response to U.S. attempts to gain a nuclear monopoly the Soviet Union created -- and in an extremely short period -- first, atomic and later, thermonuclear weapons. Subsequently, the calculations on the invulnerability provided to U.S. territory by the oceans collapsed. The loss of this invulnerability with the Soviet creation of intercontinental delivery means was obvious to all. Military-strategic parity was achieved, which was an historic socialist gain. However, even under these conditions the desire for military superiority continued to gear U.S. military policy and military-technical thinking to new adventurist solutions. These decisions have now been made in the sphere of the qualitative arms race for around 2 decades. It is believed that in this sphere it will be possible to acquire unilateral advantages which would make it possible to alter the correlation of nuclear arms in favor of the United States.

It was to this end that, from the beginning of the seventies, the United States started equipping ground- and sea-launched ballistic missiles with MIRVed warheads. As a result, over the last decade the number of strategic nuclear charges in the United States has doubled. But even in this sphere the Soviet Union swiftly found an adequate response. As a result, military-strategic parity has been maintained, but maintained at a much higher level of nuclear confrontation.

What conclusions has the U.S. military-political leadership drawn from this? However paradoxical, it has seen all this as a pretext for expediting efforts to create a "disabling potential" in the eighties and nineties. The "Scowcroft Commission" recommendations on this score approved by the President in January 1983 are typical: U.S. strategic forces should be "capable of threatening the destruction of Soviet targets, including heavily defended military command centers, missile silos, nuclear and other weapons stockpiles, and other targets."

3 March 1986

Of course, the accord reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva that the sides will not strive for military superiority is of great importance. But the two sides must implement this accord straightaway. Hitherto, alas, there is no evidence that Washington is making the necessary shifts in strategic thinking or is planning to abandon the implementation of provocative strategic programs.

The U.S. course of creating space strike arms is generating particular concern world-wide. Both its desire to acquire military superiority and the adventurism of U.S. military-technical policy is seen most clearly. The calculation is that the United States will be able to have a virtual monopoly on the militarization of space. Those are dangerous illusions!

The Soviet Union is capable of ensuring the sufficiently speedy and rational resolution of any defense tasks that arise. "Our material and intellectual potential," the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, says, "makes it possible for the Soviet Union to create any weapon if we are forced to." The Soviet Union is a country of advanced science and technology. It was the first to create an artificial earth satellite. And not only a satellite. The first passenger jet aircraft, the first nuclear power station, the first nuclear icebreaker, and the first laser were all ours. The Soviet Union is preeminent in the world in terms of the number of inventions and produces almost one-third of the world's annual scientific output and one-fifth of all solutions to technical problems. However, some people in U.S. ruling circles underestimate Soviet scientific and technical potential and clearly overestimate their own: Not for nothing did G. Kennan, the eminent U.S. scholar, note with sorrow that the United States "has no real specialists on the Soviet Union. There are just different levels of ignorance." The Pentagon calculations to leave the Soviet Union behind in terms of military technology are not only unfeasible, but dangerous. Dangerous because of their adventurist desire to create a wholly unique offensive and defensive disabling potential, in which even so-called "defensive" means would ultimately be aimed at resolving first-strike offensive tasks.

These calculations cannot be deemed anything but evidence of the aggressive thrust in military-technical policy and U.S. military strategy pursued in the hope of a victorious outcome to a nuclear war. To continue to chase the impossible dream of military superiority is a fruitless and dangerous policy. A policy unworthy of the level of civilization which present-day society has reached.

The peoples are demanding practical measures from Washington -- that it refuse to create arms which would seemingly make nuclear war "admissible." And first and foremost, that is refuse to create space strike arms. This would make it possible to embark on a radical reduction in nuclear arsenals and on their subsequent elimination by the start of the next millennium.

Contradictions in SDI

PM281020 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 86 First Edition p 5

[L. Semeyko article under the "Whence the Threat to Peace" rubric: "Rushing Into Space"]

[Text] When it is a question of attitudes to the problem of the militarization of space, it is not difficult to note a clear contradiction in the present U.S. military-political

course. On the one hand, the commitment enshrined in the joint statement on the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva is to prevent an arms race in space. On the other hand, there is the stubborn U.S. refusal to agree to the Soviet proposal for a total ban on space strike arms. To all intents and purposes Washington has set its sights on preparing for "star wars."

It is a question of turning a planned antimissile shield in space into a disabling means: According to Pentagon calculations, the "remaining" Soviet missiles and warheads that survive a massive U.S. nuclear strike and are launched in retaliation are intended to be destroyed by this shield. It is a question of the possibility of striking against targets on earth directly from combat stations located in space. Finally, it is also a question of the possibility of the emergence of fundamentally new ways of striking from space. All this would mean increasing the threat; not only to the Soviet Union, but to all mankind, to a new and qualitatively more dangerous level.

The Soviet Union is doing everything to prevent such a dangerous development of events. "The range of new foreign policy initiatives proposed by us," the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, says, "is aimed at ensuring that mankind greets the year 2000 under a peaceful sky and space, preventing mankind from fearing a nuclear, chemical, or any other threat of destruction and ensuring that mankind may be firmly confident of its own survival and of the continuance of the human race."

The United States is making attempts to present space strike means as something harmless. President Reagan states that they are "defensive" means and that they "threaten nobody." Pentagon chief Weinberger claims it is just a question of a war between opposing equipment rather than between people. "Star wars," apparently, will be no more frightening than traditional conventional wars; moreover, U.S. territory will allegedly be the most defended territory on the planet.

This interpretation of "star wars" and their consequences is aimed at naive simpletons. With the deployment of the arms race into space the danger of a nuclear war (indeed nuclear!) is sharply increased. Partly because, in the thinking of the U.S. military-political leadership, space strike arms are to "coexist" with strategic nuclear arms. "It is no accident," M.S. Gorbachev's statement says, "that the supporters of the nuclear arms race are also jealous supporters of the 'star wars' program. They are two sides of the same policy that is hostile to people's interests."

Not one of the current U.S. strategic programs has been curtailed. Many thousands of new nuclear munitions will be stockpiled before the end of this decade. Third-generation "superweapons" are being created -- specifically, an x-ray laser which transforms the energy of a nuclear explosion into powerful laser radiation. A whole dozen new types and kinds of nuclear munitions are being tested. Washington intends to continue these tests despite the calls of the world community for them to be stopped and for the United States to join the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, which, as is well known, the Soviet Union has extended until 31 March 1986.

It is planned to expedite the buildup of the Pentagon's nuclear potential even more if, say, the Soviet Union were forced to create its own large-scale ABM system as a retaliatory measure. As Weinberger has stated, this would trigger the "need to increase our own (U.S.) offensive forces and to build up their ability to overcome Soviet defense systems." In other words, at the same time as the U.S. President is promising some kind of "non-nuclear realm" under a militarized space (nuclear weapons would allegedly become "useless and obsolete"), his defense minister is openly stating the opposite: Space strike arms will not exist by themselves, they need to be combined with nuclear arms.

Nor does the Pentagon chief make any secret of the fact that he would essentially like a return to a U.S. nuclear monopoly. "If," he says, "we can obtain a system which will be effective and make the Soviet Union's arms ineffective, we will return to the situation we were in when we were the only country with nuclear weapons." Just so! With a mighty leap into space the Pentagon would like to sharply upset Soviet-U.S. strategic equilibrium and return to the situation prevailing 40 years ago. One wonders just how these schemes can be tied in with President R. Reagan's official abandonment at the Geneva summit of the intention to acquire military supremacy? Clearly, as we can see, there are glaring contradictions between declarations and reality in U.S. policy which reveal the real goals of U.S. imperialism.

The United States intends to achieve supremacy in its militarist rush into space through deploying antisatellite weapons. It is believed overseas, would make it possible for the United States to suddenly "blind" the Soviet Union. "A strike using antisatellite means against early-warning satellites could open up the way for a quite effective surprise first strike against targeted nuclear arms and control centers," D. (Kerr), one of the U.S. leaders of the program for the militarization of space, stated.

Another impossible aim described by the well-known U.S. specialists (J. Ratzhens) and (J. Ruina) is also obvious here: "To prompt the Soviet Union to not consider ICBM's as the main buttress of its nuclear forces and to replace them with other systems." In other words, to attempt to make the Soviet Union restructure the very foundations of its strategic might in such a way as to give the United States the advantage once again.

The logic of the proponents of a first disabling strike is crudely simple: The United States will be invulnerable and the Soviet Union vulnerable. Soviet strategic forces will be undermined by a surprise strike while U.S. territory will be invulnerable to a retaliatory strike. Moreover, the United States will retain a strategic nuclear reserve for subsequently destroying the Soviet population "if it does not capitulate."

These perfidious schemes are admitted by sober-minded U.S. specialists. Here, for instance, is what S. Hoffmann, the eminent political scientist, wrote in the New York review of books: The Soviet Union has every justification for believing that the "combination of the expedited buildup of the colossal arsenals of offensive first-strike arms (MX missiles, new high-accuracy warheads on other ICBM's, D-5 missiles on submarines, Pershing-2's, and Stealth bombers) with U.S. defense systems will make it possible for the United States to weaken a Soviet retaliatory strike."

The "star wars" program, which is presented as the "Strategic Defense Initiative" for cover, is part and parcel of the programs intended for the implementation of offensive nuclear strategy. The main function of space strike arms is to resolve the task of disarming the Soviet Union as effectively as possible.

Thus, the plans for a U.S. military rush into space are not something isolated. Moreover, they are by no means defensive. Their true aggressive essence is revealed when they are seen in conjunction with the plans to build up strategic offensive arms. If U.S. nuclear strategy and its aggressive military doctrine are also taken into account it becomes even more obvious that the U.S. forces of aggression and reaction are rushing into space, threatening the security of the Soviet Union on a much greater scale than before. At the same time this poses a threat to international security as a whole and a threat to the existence of life itself on earth.

"Mankind," M.S. Gorbachev's statement says, "is at a crucial stage of the new space age. It is time to abandon Stone Age thinking when the main concern was to provide oneself with a bigger stick or a heavier stone. We are against weapons in space." Now people are demanding that statesmen abandon their caveman logic in political thinking and have a keener recognition of their responsibility for the peoples' destiny, which would accord with the aspirations of all mankind. But for this it is necessary for Washington to look realistically at the military-political situation in the world and revise its own exceptionally dangerous militarist approaches to the resolution of the most important problems of war and peace before it is too late.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR 26 JANUARY WEEKLY 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE'

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["International Observers Roundtable" program with Aleksey Nikolayevich Grigoryev, TASS political observer; Viktor Aleksandrovich Tsoppi, a member of the editorial collegium of the weekly NOVOYE VREMYA; and Igor Pavlovich Charikov, All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator]

Gorbachev Proposal

[Excerpt] [Charikov] Hello, esteemed comrades! The new Soviet program for the step-by-step reduction of nuclear armaments and ultimately for their complete elimination which was set out by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his statement of 15 January has with no exaggeration attracted universal attention in the world. The basic points contained in this document continue to occupy the main space on the pages of the world's major press organs. This subject features in the statements and pronouncements of eminent state and public figures from different countries.

[Tsoppi] This subject has virtually pushed into the background all other problems in the international situation. I would like to draw attention to the latest issue of TIME magazine which makes this very point. This very noteworthy article is entitled: Farewell to Arms. It says that the Soviet Union has called for the complete elimination of nuclear missiles, warheads, bombs, and other weapons in our world. This was not put forward as some kind of vague objective for the future. The Soviet leader has formulated a fairly detailed three-step plan, which has to be implemented by the end of this century.

[Charikov] Yes, Viktor Aleksandrovich, this plan really is very thorough and very specific. It lists the measures which have to be carried out at each of the five [as heard] stages. But I would like to suggest that today we concentrate on one of the components, on one of the parts of this plan -- a component which in my view is particularly important. I am talking about the decision of the Soviet Union to extend the moratorium on underground nuclear explosions by a further 3 months. I use the word extend because this moratorium has been in operation since 6 August. This is a very memorable date, indeed, it is the date of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

[Grigoryev] It was the 40th anniversary.

[Charikov] So the Soviet moratorium, the unilateral moratorium on all types of nuclear tests, was in operation from 6 August to 31 December.

[Tsoppi] But the United States did not respond to our proposal that they join in this moratorium.

[Charikov] Quite right. So the Soviet Union, attaching enormous importance to this very issue of ending the testing of nuclear weapons as one of the radical ways of halting the further improvement of nuclear weapons and creating new varieties, well, the Soviet Union decided within the framework of this new program to extend the period of its own unilateral moratorium. I would like to return to some extent to the history of the testing of nuclear weapons in general. The date 16 July 1945 is regarded as the beginning of the nuclear era, the era of the atom intended to serve the aims of destruction. The first nuclear device was detonated on that day at the population center of Alamogordo in the state of New Mexico. It was detonated and tested. And on

6 August, that is to say literally less than a month later, it was already used against Japan. The bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

[Tsoppi] It was not simply used against Japan, which was waging war, but against Japan's peaceful cities, against completely innocent people.

[Charikov] It has been calculated that throughout all the years that have passed since then, more than 1,500 nuclear explosions have been carried out in the world. Karl Fischer, Austria's representative at the United Nations, put it very aptly when he said that this was 1,500 times more than was necessary. No doubt his thinking was that it would have been possible to be limited to one test and to go no further in the development. But let's return to the political side of this issue. The Soviet Union has become the initiator, or, if you like, the main protagonist in the campaign for a ban on all nuclear tests. The result of talks and efforts that lasted for many years was the signing in Moscow in 1963 of a treaty on a partial ban on nuclear weapons [as heard] in three spheres -- in the air, in outer space and under water. The representative of three powers -- the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain -- signed this document. Currently, 113 of the world's states have joined in this treaty, that is to say, they have effectively become participants in it. Even at the time of the preparation of the Moscow treaty, the Soviet Union insisted on the inclusion of a point banning underground nuclear explosions. At that time, however, neither the United States nor Great Britain were willing to raise this issue, much less discuss it.

[Tsoppi] To this day, they are still frightened of this issue being raised for some reason.

[Charikov] Quite right. Nevertheless, upon the initiative, once again upon the initiative of the Soviet Union, talks were started in 1977 on this very issue of banning underground nuclear tests. Things did not go badly overall, and, as the historic documents show, sometime around the summer of 1980 a draft treaty was ready in rough form. However, quite unexpectedly, talks with the United States were broken off. Why? If one looks at the international situation at that time, in those years, I recall first and foremost the so-called two-track decision of NATO. That decision was made in 1979. What it amounted to was this: to saturate Western Europe with U.S. medium-range missiles, nuclear missiles. This action could not in any way correspond to the very subject of the talks, the tripartite talks on banning nuclear weapons tests. No doubt this was one of the reasons why, to begin with, the United States broke off the talks and later refused to continue them. What's more, if you noticed this, they did so unilaterally. The Soviet Union comes out unilaterally in favor of banning nuclear weapons; it introduced a moratorium that began on 6 August of last year, and extends the period for which it operates; while the United States, also unilaterally, overturns all these efforts.

[Grigoryev] Moreover, given that we have mentioned history, given that we are now talking about the fact that we have introduced a moratorium on two occasions, to begin with we declared the moratorium and then we extended it for 3 months -- there arises a natural and perfectly legitimate question: What then about the United States? This question is being asked primarily in the United States itself. Americans are asking why we have to continue carrying out nuclear explosions if the Soviet Union has stopped. Very different kinds of people are asking this question: politicians, what they refer to as the man in the street in America...

[Tsoppi, interrupting] And public organizations, mass public organizations.

[Grigoryev] Yes, certainly.

[Charikov] And the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee voted in favor of a resolution calling on Reagan to resume these talks, which were broken off in 1982.

[Grigoryev] Without doubt the Soviet program that was put forward in the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, which proposes other measures besides the moratorium in the disarmament field, without doubt this has produced a tremendous impression primarily in the United States. I would like to return to the magazine that was quoted by Viktor Aleksandrovich, TIME magazine, and to quote a few lines from it where it talks about the link between the arms race on earth and the arms race in space which the United States is planning. What does the continuation of nuclear explosions mean? It means in fact going over to the further buildup of preparations for "star wars" -- is that not the case? In other words everything is intertwined.

[Tsoppi] I would like to recall that the statement by the general secretary says clearly and precisely that if the United States ends all nuclear explosions on a reciprocal basis, then the proper monitoring of observance of the moratorium will be provided in full by national technical means and also with the help of international procedures, with on-site inspection in cases where necessary. We invite the United States to come to an agreement on this. In other words, the last trump card in the hands of those who are insisting that nuclear weapons tests continue has been knocked out.

[Charikov] That is, the pretext that there is no verification.

[Tsoppi] Yes, that the Soviet Union does not agree to reciprocal monitoring. But by all means we do agree. You're welcome to it. And throughout the world people cannot understand why, when we are ending tests and when we are agreeing to monitoring, the United States is unable to agree to either of these things. Although as the British GUARDIAN wrote a few days ago, the United States could join in the nuclear weapons test moratorium without suffering any loss.

[Charikov] The idea of renouncing underground nuclear weapons as a means through which the arms race is fed has also been received with great approval in a whole range of other countries. At the end of last year the leaders of six countries; Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden, that is to say, countries representing different continents and countries at different stages of economic development, appealed to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States to completely end all types of nuclear tests. At almost the same time the 40th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly adopted a corresponding resolution which

received the votes of an overwhelming majority of world community member-states. Both these calls, each of the highest authority, were made at a time when the Soviet moratorium was already in operation, the moratorium that it had unilaterally declared. So, the resolute demand to put an end to the testing of new types of nuclear weapons, to block the channels of its further improvement, and to put an end to the nuclear era that began during the first half of the 20th century and which must come to a halt before the end of the century, this demand was accordingly addressed to Washington in the first place. PRAVDA yesterday published a report that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev once again confirmed the resolve of the Soviet Union to continue to seek the complete and universal banning of nuclear test explosions. It is essential that every opportunity be used to achieve the establishment of a bilateral Soviet-U.S. moratorium on this.

Press Freedom, Disinformation

[Tsoppil] I would like to say that a very definite line is being taken, both in the mass media and in right-wing political circles in the United States. This line is becoming more and more cynical as far as the stance on our peace-loving proposals and our persistence in the matter of ensuring peace is concerned. Literally a few days ago an article in THE WASHINGTON POST contained the following sentence: One must not pretend that the world can some day be completely rid of the threat of nuclear armaments. Pretend. The same observer goes on about why one must not pretend: Because the hope is created that in fact there is some alternative to nuclear war, whereas the inevitable truth is such that there is no alternative. That is the fatally resigned and gloomy attitude they have toward the most important problem of the present-day world.

[Grigoryev] It has to be said that the American press -- a section of the American press, let us say, which is particularly close to the White House -- is attempting not only to put up against our proposals something that is incapable of being put up against them, but is somehow, of course it is impossible to silence them, but is at least attempting to pretend that the proposals have allegedly been discussed and are no longer the object of the world public's attention. THE WASHINGTON POST, which you mentioned, once suddenly wrote that the Soviet proposals had an enormous impact in the United States and throughout the world, and wrote the following: Yesterday 42 Republican senators had lunch with President Reagan. They had a lively discussion about taxes, the budget, etc, and not one of the senators raised the issue of the Soviet proposals. There is a deafening silence in Europe, no one has found time to comment on this. So that, with absolute insolence and cynicism, as you correctly state, white is being presented as black and vice versa in an attempt to pretend that nothing has happened. However, this will hardly succeed in any case. Hardly! I mentioned TIME, which you quoted from at the beginning. It writes quite the opposite to what its colleagues at THE WASHINGTON POST are writing: It writes that the Soviet proposals are put together in such a way as to immediately appeal to many inhabitants of Western European countries who are alarmed by nuclear missiles. Because of the Russians' initiative it will now be even more difficult for Reagan to justify continuing his "star wars" program. Reagan has ended up in a difficult position from the public relations point of view. It will be difficult for him to explain convincingly why he is prepared to reject a plan for saving the world from nuclear missiles. The Russians will probably also draw Reagan's attention to a somewhat illogical statement which he made at one point in his interview with four Soviet journalists, when he promised to strive to eliminate nuclear weapons before deploying his space systems.

[Tsoppi] Before deploying.

[Grigoryev] Yes, he promised. Now it has been proposed to eliminate them before deployment, but as yet, apart from more or less favorable statements, the United States has taken no tangible steps.

[Charikov] You know, Viktor Aleksandrovich, when you were quoting pronouncements of that WASHINGTON POST observer who sees no other alternative than the arms race, an arms build-up, ensuring military superiority over the Soviet Union, I was reminded of the atmosphere which prevailed at least at the beginning of the news conference in Moscow at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center in connection with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement. I was present at that news conference and looked at the faces of individual American correspondents and began to feel sad. I observed that they had come to that news conference with their minds already made up. They had not yet looked at the diagram explaining and setting out everything in detail. They were already carrying the outline of their future reports in their heads and therefore it is not surprising that THE WASHINGTON POST immediately responded the way it did without troubling itself with any kind of analysis or attempt at finding common sense, at picking out common sense, yet journalists and the press bear the most mighty responsibility.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

PRAVDA PUBLISHES GORBACHEV ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM L'HUMANITE

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["M.S. Gorbachev's Answers to Questions From the Newspaper L'HUMANITE"--
PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] L'HUMANITE, the central organ of the French Communist Party [PCF], asked M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to answer a number of questions.

On 4 February this year M.S. Gorbachev received R. Leroy, member of the PCF Politburo and political director of L'HUMANITE, G. Streiff, L'HUMANITE's permanent correspondent in Moscow, and (J.) Faure, chief of the paper's international desk.

M.S. Gorbachev's answers to L'HUMANITE's questions are published below.

Question: May we now move on to international questions. Could the U.S. "star wars" plans lead to war? Have you noticed any new signs of the restoration of detente in international relations since the Geneva summit?

Answer: You have asked two questions at once.

The first is about the U.S. "star wars" program. We are profoundly convinced that this program really increases the threat of war and at a certain stage may make it probable. I have often spoken -- and in sufficient detail -- about the foundations of that argument. I would like to devote attention to just one aspect of the problem. Although the planned implementation of the entire "star wars" venture is decades away and only a handful of "enthusiasts" believe in its implementation, if the United States persists in the matter it will have serious consequences in the very near future. The point is that, in implementing the "star wars" program, Washington is in essence consciously aiming to wreck the talks that are currently under way and annul all existing arms limitation agreements. Were this to happen, the USSR and the United States, their allies, and the entire world would find themselves in the next few years in a situation of an absolutely uncontrolled arms race, strategic chaos, a highly dangerous undermining of stability, and universal uneasiness and fear with a concomitant increased risk of catastrophe. This, I repeat, is a danger that threatens not just our grandchildren but us ourselves all of us, all mankind.

Why take this risk? I concede that President Reagan personally believes in the "salvation" mission of "star wars." But if the whole point is to put an end to the nuclear threat, why does the United States not agree in principle with the USSR's recent proposals: They provide for a far shorter, more direct, cheaper, and, the main thing, safer path toward the elimination of the nuclear threat -- the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I emphasize -- a safer path. After all, the path the United States is now proposing toward this goal is hopeless. Despite the assertions of the champions of "star wars," nuclear weapons will simply not have time to "grow obsolete," on the contrary, they will be improved. And matters may reach the point where they become so complex that decisions have to be assigned entirely to computers, to automata. Human civilization will thus be made the hostage of machines and therefore of technical errors and breakdowns. How dangerous this is was shown once again by the recent tragedy with the U.S. space ship Challenger -- a reliable space ship which had been repeatedly tested and checked within the limits to which this is generally possible today.

I am sure that Washington is also well aware of this and that over there for each "believer" in this surreal plan to get rid of the nuclear threat there are at least 10 cynics who have in mind something quite different from what President Reagan is obviously talking and dreaming about. For instance, some people, realizing that you cannot create an "impenetrable shield," are prepared for less, for a limited ABM defense which in combination with preventive strike means against the other side's forces of retaliation would create the possibility of carrying out nuclear aggression with impunity. Others simply want to make a profit. Others, by dragging the USSR into the space race, want to undermine its economy. Others want to increase the United States' technical lead over Western Europe and thus ensure the latter's dependence... Well, and so on.

So the question of "star wars" is a very broad question. Here it is not only two views of this specific program but also two approaches, two concepts of security which have clashed. The U.S. concept is the concept of safeguarding security primarily through military-technical means, in this case through a new "superweapon," through a technical focus which would help find a way out of the nuclear impasse.

Here, despite the very vague, absurdly implausible talk about being ready "when the time comes" to share the "miracle-technology" with other countries (including the USSR) the United States wants to get out of this impasse on its own: to achieve absolute security for itself and to place everyone else in a position of "absolute danger."

The Soviet concept is the concept of safeguarding equal security for all on the path of arms reduction and disarmament, right up to the total elimination of all types of weapons of mass annihilation. Because in our time there can be no security for the USSR without security for the United States, no security for the Warsaw Pact countries without security for the NATO countries. Without their mutual security there can be no universal security.

Answering your question, I want to particularly highlight the problem of Europe's liberation from nuclear weapons, above all the medium-range missiles which are seriously undermining European security. Here, too, we have the right to count on the realism and prudence of British and, of course, French policy.

The champions of nuclear armaments are putting into play the argument that their elimination will leave the West "defenseless" in the face of Soviet "superiority" in so-called conventional armaments. I will not argue right now about whether such

"superiority" exists or not. The main thing lies elsewhere -- our proposals provide for the reduction of these armaments as well, as they do for the consolidation of confidence-building measures. We did not come out with the proposal to put an end to nuclear weapons simply to move the arms race to other spheres which with time will become no less dangerous.

We realize that the implementation of our security concept requires tremendous efforts, labor, a persistent struggle, and the breaking of traditions thousands of years old, as I have already said. But the world simply cannot continue to live and act in the old way when the threat of nuclear war is a reality.

Is a world without weapons, a world without wars, possible at all? I would answer this question with another question: Is it conceivable to preserve human civilization by continuing the constantly accelerating arms race, fuelling tension and balancing on what is, so to speak, the constantly narrowing brink of war?

Have there been noticeable signs of the restoration of detente in international relations since the Geneva summit? Here, in my view, we should be cautious in our assessments. Yes, some signs are beginning to appear. It is not only and not so much a case of individual little advances in the field of Soviet-U.S. relations. They are too limited and peripheral and do not affect fundamental questions. On the other hand a certain change in the political atmosphere can already be felt. This has generated among the peoples of many countries hope and faith in the possibility of returning to detente, halting the senseless arms race, and developing normal peaceful international cooperation. This is already something real and politically substantial.

The changing political atmosphere also helps us, helps the Soviet Union, to approach the elaboration of new proposals and new initiatives more boldly and resolutely. I am sometimes asked: Can the Soviet Union believe that the present U.S. Administration and the governments of some of the countries that are its allied will agree to the new Soviet proposals? Proposals like the total prohibition of nuclear explosions, the gradual destruction of nuclear weapons in Europe and throughout the world, the prevention of the arms race in space, and so forth, for example?

A natural question. But a policy, particularly in the nuclear age, cannot be built on the basis of the principle of trusting your partner completely or not at all.

A policy must be built on real foundations, taking into account the distribution of forces in the international arena, the requirements of the time, and the interests of one's own people, of other peoples, and of world peace. Since that is so, the Soviet Union, as a socialist state, simply has to propose to the world a radical and at the same time realistic alternative to nuclear war which considers the interests of all peoples, a program for resolving the problems facing mankind. These proposals are a kind of "moment of truth." They make our partners in the talks show their real worth and reveal the aims their policy is really pursuing. When we proposed a moratorium on nuclear weapon explosions, we were told: See here, you schemers, you carried out more tests this year (that was not true even then, incidentally) and now you are suggesting that the United States stop. For the 7th month now we have carried out no tests. Now even the United States cannot use that pretext. Now they have begun to speak of verification [kontrol] and inspection [proverka]. We expressed the readiness for any inspection [proverka] measures. That pretext disappeared as well. What remains? Is it not only the U.S. determination to continue the arms race come what may?

The "Decree on Peace" written by V.I. Lenin (it was, by the way, the new-born Soviet Government's very first decree) expressed the firm intention of the first socialist state in history to pursue policy and to act "...openly in front of the entire people," to address its proposals to "governments and peoples," and to "help the peoples to intervene in questions of war and peace." "We will struggle," Lenin said when presenting the draft of that decree to the Congress of Soviets, "against the deceitfulness of governments which talk constantly about peace and justice while in reality waging predatory, annexationist wars." At the same time, with the Soviet Land's relations with the capitalist powers in mind, he also said: "We dare not and we must not allow governments to hide behind our obduracy and to conceal from the peoples why they are being sent to the slaughter... Our enemies use ultimatums to ease their own positions. We, however, show the people all the conditions. We confront all governments with our terms, and they have to answer to their own peoples."

That is the principled, communist statement of the question. I have not recalled these words of Lenin, those Leninist principles by chance. There is a profound similarity between the situations then and now. In 1917, at the height of World War I, the main question was: How could the bloodshed imposed on the peoples by the imperialist governments be ended any sooner? V.I. Lenin and the party determined that the most effective way was to appeal not just to the governments but also to the peoples. Today the world's peoples have been drawn into an arms race and a nuclear rivalry which threatens even more dreadful slaughter. So naturally, as we work persistently and painstakingly with the Western government on resolving these problems, we constantly also turn to the peoples and address our policy to them.

R. Leroy: It is clear that the French people have a particular interest in rapprochement and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

M.S. Gorbachev: In implementing our foreign policy we always take into account the interests of France and its people. This is evidenced again by our latest proposals, advanced in my statement of 15 January.

We consider it natural, by the way, that we should take account when formulating our proposals of the legitimate interests not only of France but also, say, of such a partner of ours as the United States, otherwise such proposals would not be realistic.

I have told President Mitterrand in conversations with him, and I want to repeat now, that we have not the slightest intention of damaging the security of France. In our recent proposals we proceed from the premise that France, like Britain, will join the process of nuclear disarmament only when the United States and the Soviet Union make [osushchestvyat] significant reductions in nuclear weapons. For now we would like to be able to count on France and Britain not boosting their nuclear strength further in the period of reduction of the U.S. and Soviet weapons arsenals.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET JOURNAL LAUDS DECLARATION OF SOUTH PACIFIC ZONE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 85
pp 99-106

[Article by V. Amirov and Yu. Belokon: "Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific"]

[Text] A new phenomenon in the international-political life of the Pacific--the strengthening movement for the creation in the South Pacific of a zone free of nuclear weapons--has been calling increasingly great attention to itself recently.

The decision concerning the formation of such a zone was adopted on 6 August 1985 at the 16th session of the South Pacific Forum in Avarua, the administrative center of the Cook Islands (Rarotonga Island).^{*} The event, which occurred in a remote part of the planet, on a tiny island lost amid vast ocean expanses, has had extensive repercussions throughout the world. And this is not fortuitous inasmuch as it concerns the most burning topic of the present day--the problem of an end to the arms race and elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

There is now an increasingly perceived need that energetic work to curb the arms race be performed in all directions. An important place here is occupied, as before, by measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in reply to an appeal of the Japanese Council of Organizations of Victims of the Atomic Bombings, "our country treats with understanding the endeavor of many states to create nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world. We support the creation of such zones in, for example, North Europe, the Balkans, in Southeast Asia and in Africa. The efforts of states of the South Pacific to create a nuclear-free zone in this region merit approval."^{**}

^{*} As is known, currently the world's sole nuclear-free zone, which is enshrined in international-law form in accordance with the "Tlatelolco Treaty" (which was signed in 1967 and which came into force in 1969), is Latin America. In addition, a de facto nuclear-free zone is Antarctica, where a corresponding international treaty (signed in 1959, came into force in 1961) prohibits any military activity at all and stipulates specially, furthermore, that all nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive material in this region are banned. The treaty's provisions apply to the area south of Latitude 60 degrees South, including shelf glaciers.

^{**}PRAVDA, 6 August 1985.

The participants in the session of the Socialist International Bureau in mid-October 1985 in Vienna supported the idea of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific region.

The territory encompassed by the nuclear-free zone being created in the Pacific is impressive primarily for its dimensions. According to the description provided in Appendix I to the "Avarua Treaty" and the sketch map appended thereto, the zone is described by a line starting at the point of intersection of the equator and the northern maritime frontier between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. It then runs eastward basically along the equator, with the exception of certain sectors, where it runs somewhat to the north of it (as far as Latitude 5 degrees 30 minutes North). The eastern boundary is the 115th meridian of Longitude West, while the southern boundary is the 60th parallel. In the West the line of the zone runs initially along the 115th meridian of Longitude East and then along the outer frontier of the territorial waters of Australia and the maritime and land frontier between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, thus closing the perimeter of the zone. The latter includes also the islands in the Indian Ocean belonging to Australia.

The following facts also provide an idea of the scale of the nuclear-free zone. Although the total population of the countries which are incorporated in the South Pacific Forum is small (less than 24 million), the aggregate dimensions of the territory they occupy constitute approximately 8.5 million square kilometers. The area of their 200-mile economic zones is truly vast (for example, for Australia it constitutes 6.4 million square kilometers, for Papua New Guinea 3.1 million square kilometers).

I

To understand the essence of what occurred on 6 August in Avarua a retrospective glance at the development of events in this region in recent decades is appropriate. First, concerning the body which made the decision. The South Pacific Forum is a regional organization which has been in existence since 1971. The leading part in its creation was played by Australia, which has the biggest political and economic influence in the region. Originally the forum was made up of 6 states and 1 self-governing territory. In line with the development of the decolonization process, which has been stepped up particularly here since the mid-1970's, the number of its participants has reached 13. They include, besides Australia, one other developed capitalist country--New Zealand--9 independent developing states--Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Fiji and also Niue and the Cook Islands, which have the status of self-governing territories in "free association" with New Zealand.

Since the time of the emergence of the South Pacific Forum its participants have proclaimed as their main goal the establishment of mutual economic cooperation. However, with time--particularly in recent years--increasingly great significance has come to be attached to interaction in questions of foreign policy also. The set of problems connected with nuclear weapons, the nuclear threat, the conducting of nuclear explosions here and their consequences is moving to the forefront here.

There have been and continue to be particular reasons for a kind of "nuclear allergy" on the part of the peoples of the region. The point being that practically throughout the postwar period it has served and continues to serve as the most important and, it may be said, sole nuclear firing range of its kind of the Western powers. Thus the United States carried out nuclear explosions from 1946 through 1963 on a number of atolls of the Marshall Islands, which are situated north of Nauru and Kiribati. Australia's Victoria Desert was the site of British atomic weapon tests in the 1950's and 1960's. Instances of the secret burial in the former testing area of Maralinga of the British atomic industry's radioactive waste were revealed recently. The United States and Great Britain were "relieved," as it were, by France. After Algeria had won independence, it transferred its nuclear testing center from the Sahara to Eastern Oceania. More than 100 nuclear explosions, including 45 in the atmosphere (up to 1975), have been conducted here, in Polynesia, which since 1958 has had the status of "overseas territory," on the Mururoa (the main testing site) and Fangatau atolls from 1966 through 1985. Approximately eight tests are now conducted annually. As a whole, according to foreign press reports, the Western powers have exploded over 250 atomic and hydrogen bombs in the Pacific, which has done tremendous damage to the population and environment of the areas adjacent to the test sites.

But for the countries and peoples of the South Pacific there are other aspects of the nuclear problem also. They are connected primarily with the Pentagon's assertive activity in the region, the scale of which is growing constantly. The ocean waters are being plied by American ships with nuclear weapons on board. In a number of states of the forum the U.S. armed forces have the opportunity to use airfields, ports and other installations, not to mention the presence of large American military bases on Australian territory. Important military and naval facilities of the Pentagon are located in neighboring Micronesia, where nuclear and chemical weapons are stored and there are firing ranges for testing ICBM's. Reports have appeared concerning the existence in a number of Western states of plans to dispose of and bury radioactive waste (spent nuclear power station fuel, in particular) in certain parts of the Pacific (in the Marianas, for example).

Thus there are more than enough factors engendering antinuclear sentiments and movements in this region. At the same time circumstances of another kind have to be taken into consideration also. It is primarily a question of considerable--and in some cases huge--differences in the economic and political position of the Pacific Forum members and, correspondingly, their far from equal role in the affairs of the region. All this gives rise to differences in their positions in respect of the nuclear problem as a whole and individual aspects thereof. Furthermore, the very essence of the problem has undergone considerable change. Whereas initially its seriousness was determined mainly by the conducting of nuclear weapons tests, in time the significance of other aspects began to grow also. Thus a new factor appeared stimulating antinuclear sentiments and exerting an increasingly big influence on the policy of the governments--the broad public movement in support of the deliverance of the region from nuclear weapons. And, finally, compared with the period of 10-15 years ago, when the decisive part in questions of the determination of nuclear policy here was played by Australia (and also New Zealand), now the voices of the region's young developing states are ringing out increasingly loudly.

II

The way to the decision on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific proved difficult and for this reason quite long. The idea itself was advanced for the first time officially in 1973. A number of factors contributed to this. Among these were primarily the assumption of office in Australia and New Zealand of the Labor parties, in which (particularly among the ordinary members) antinuclear sentiments had begun to spread markedly. And, of course, the trend toward the relaxation of international tensions, which acquired considerable impetus at the start of the 1970's, could not have failed to have been reflected in the political situation in the region.

The first to present the idea of the creation of a nuclear-free zone was New Zealand (its position on this issue is at the present time also more consistent than many other countries of the forum). Two years later, in 1975, this initiative was supported, although not without hesitation, by Australia, which voted at the UN General Assembly 30th Session in support of the corresponding proposal, which had been submitted by New Zealand in conjunction with Papua New Guinea and Fiji. The point was that the existence of large reserves of uranium and developed scientific-technical and industrial potential was prompting a certain section of Australia's ruling circles to think about the possibility of the creation in the future of its own nuclear weapons.* There were--and continue to be--serious internal political disagreements on the question of uranium production in the country. They are also occurring in the Labor Party itself, whose left wing supports a total ban on the mining and export of uranium. But the main factor, perhaps, countering the trend in favor of support for the idea of a nuclear-free zone were Australian-American military-political relations--both bilateral and along ANZUS bloc lines.

At the same time, however, Canberra began also to take into consideration increasingly the essential benefits which it would derive from support for the idea of the creation of a nuclear-free zone. It was assumed there that this would underpin Australia's claims to the role of a kind of "regional leader" (from the angle of interimperialist rivalry with France, which owns here, besides Polynesia, other "overseas territories" also, included) and markedly increase its political influence. Hopes for a broadening of the possibilities of foreign policy maneuvering beyond the confines of Oceania also (in relations with the developing states included) were also bound up with this. In short, Canberra's policy in the nuclear field was determined from the angle of the search for ways and means of enhancing the country's role and place in world politics.

Conservative parties returned to office in Australia and New Zealand in 1975, which pushed aside the problems of a nuclear-free zone. Thus the New Zealand Government once again permitted calls at the country's ports of American ships with nuclear weapons on board, while the Australian Government lifted in 1976 the ban on calls of nuclear-powered warships which had been in effect since 1972. The subsequent years of conservative rule were characterized as a whole by a

* While having signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1969, Australia ratified it only in 1973.

strengthening of the two countries' military-political relations with the United States within the ANZUS framework, while the proposals connected with a limitation of nuclear activity in the region were reflected merely in documents of the opposition parties.

The idea of the creation of a nuclear-free zone acquired new impetus with the assumption of office in Australia in March 1983 of the Labor government headed by R. Hawke. In 1982 the party conference had determined its platform on this problem. It condemned nuclear explosions and the disposal of nuclear waste in the ocean and demanded an end to "all kinds of nuclear activity" in the South Pacific. The prevention of calls at Australian ports of warships carrying nuclear weapons was envisaged.*

The question of the creation of a nuclear-free zone became an important element of the policy of the R. Hawke government. The right-of-center leadership of the Labor Party connected with support for this idea hopes for a strengthening of its domestic policy positions, hoping that this, in particular, would help neutralize the demands of the party's left wing, which occupies a more radical position on various aspects of the nuclear problem, and "curb" the growing antiwar movements in the country. In the foreign policy plane Canberra, having taken the initiative in the creation of a nuclear-free zone, endeavored to direct into a certain channel the antiwar activeness of the young states of Oceania threatening the positions of imperialism in this region and to strengthen its authority in the South Pacific Forum. Simultaneously the R. Hawke government hoped to expand the field of diplomatic maneuvering (primarily in relations with France and the United States) and thereby impart to its foreign policy greater dynamism within the framework of the entire Asia-Pacific region.

The possibilities of negotiations of the countries of the South Pacific subregion concerning the creation within its confines of a nuclear-free zone increased with the assumption of office in New Zealand in July 1984 of the Labor Party. The ban imposed by the D. Lange government on calls at the country's ports of ships with nuclear weapons on board and nuclear-powered ships served as the catalyst for a further growth of antinuclear sentiments in the states of the South Pacific Forum. Its 15th session, which was held in August 1984 in Funafuti (Tuvalu), determined the general provisions of the status of the future nuclear-free zone and adopted the decision to prepare a draft of the corresponding treaty for the next session, for which a working group headed by the Australian representative was set up.

The draft treaty was drawn up in an atmosphere of the intensified struggle of various political and social forces in the subregion around the problem of nuclear disarmament. Of course, outside pressure, primarily on the part of Washington, which is stubbornly insisting that the D. Lange government cancel its decision, was reflected also. The profound crack which has appeared in ANZUS has seriously troubled the Australian Government. Despite the readiness which is displayed constantly to support the general foreign policy line of the United

* In February 1984 the Labor Government, following consultations with the United States and Great Britain, abandoned further compliance with this provision of the election platform.

States, on this question it evidently did not consider it advisable to put too strong pressure on New Zealand. In addition, the antiwar, antinuclear movement had strengthened in the country itself. The pronounced success at the December 1984 parliamentary elections of the Nuclear Disarmament Party, which had been formed only 18 months prior to then, testified, in particular, to its stimulation. The fall (according to the Australian calendar) antiwar marches acquired in 1985 a mass character. Thus, according to press estimates, approximately 400,000 persons took to the streets on 31 March in all the main and the majority of the peripheral cities of the country. Over 8.5 million of the country's inhabitants are living in cities and districts which their municipalities have declared nuclear-free zones.

As we can see, the interweaving of a whole number of factors--of both a foreign and domestic policy nature--determined the basic motives which conditioned the interest of both Australia and New Zealand (despite the differences, considerable at times, moreover, in their positions) in the speediest adoption of a decision on the creation of a nuclear-free zone. But this interest also prompted them to make efforts to reduce to a common denominator the very different opinions of and approaches to this issue of the developing countries of Oceania. Ultimately, the document prepared by the working group and approved in Avarua recorded the basic principles preliminarily determined by the states of the forum in 1984 at its session in Funafuti.

III

The preamble to the Treaty on the Creation in the South Pacific of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons proclaims the allegiance of its signatory states to the cause of peace throughout the world; it expresses their serious concern at the continuing arms race, which is leading to the "risk of nuclear war with its devastating consequences for all mankind," as, equally, the belief that "all countries are obliged to make every effort for the achievement of the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons" and the removal of the threat which they represent for mankind and life on Earth; expresses the confidence that "regional arms control measures could contribute to global efforts for a turning back of the nuclear arms race and promote the national security of each country of this region" and general security for all; and confirms once again "the importance of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons for preventing the spread of such weapons and promoting international security".

The communique adopted on the results of the Avarua session observes that "the signing of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific...reflects the profound concern of all members of the forum at the continuing nuclear arms race and the risk of nuclear war". The resumption of the Soviet-American Geneva negotiations is welcomed in this context and the hope expressed that these negotiations "achieve their stated goal--both a reduction in nuclear arms as far as their final liquidation and the prevention of an arms race in space".

The basic provisions of the treaty are recorded in articles 3 through 7.

Thus article 3 proclaims a renunciation of nuclear explosive devices. The subscriber-countries undertake here: "a) not to produce or acquire and not to

possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere-- within or beyond the confines of the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific; b) not to endeavor to obtain or obtain any assistance in the production or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device; c) not to engage in any actions to assist or encourage the production or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any state".

Article 4 concerns the peaceful aspects of nuclear activity. In particular, the subscriber-countries undertake to supply fissionable material for the use for peaceful purposes to any nonnuclear state only in accordance with the safeguards provided for by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to any nuclear power only in accordance with safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

Article 5 contains an undertaking to prevent the deployment on one's territory of nuclear explosive devices. However, "each subscriber, by way of the exercise of its sovereign rights, is free to decide whether to permit visits of foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields and the crossing of its airspace by aircraft and the navigation of foreign ships in its territorial waters..."

Article 65 undertakes "to prevent the testing of any nuclear explosive device on its territory" and "not to engage in any actions to assist or encourage tests of any nuclear explosive device by any state".

Finally, article 7 contains an undertaking "not to dispose of radioactive waste and other radioactive substances in the sea anywhere within the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific" and not to help or encourage anyone to such actions; "to prevent the disposal of radioactive waste and other radioactive substances by anyone in one's territorial waters"; and to support the conclusion as quickly as possible of a convention concerning protection of the natural resources and environment in the South Pacific region and a protocol thereto on the prevention of the pollution of this area by way of the disposal in the sea of radioactive substances.

The creation of a system of control of compliance with the provisions of the treaty, an exchange of information, consultations within the framework of a consultative committee established for these purposes and so forth are provided for. The treaty is to be ratified by each subscriber-country. It is of an indefinite nature and will take effect from the time its instruments of ratification are deposited. The depositary is the director of the South Pacific Office of Economic Cooperation, which is the main executive authority of the South Pacific Forum.

The treaty was signed in Avarua by the heads of government of eight states and territories (Australia, Western Samoa, Kiribati, Niue, New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Tuvalu and Fiji). Concerning the other participants in the forum, the communique on the results of the session noted understanding of the fact that they could not sign the treaty until the appropriate constitutional procedures were observed.

Of course, the laws of each country have their singularities. But it is obviously not only a question of this. There are also purely political reasons

engendered by the nature of the document adopted at the Avarua session and the varying attitude thereto on the part of states of the region.

The greatest attention is attracted in this connection by article 5 of the treaty, whose content was spoken of above. After all, it may also be interpreted in the sense that it affords foreign states, nuclear included, an opportunity to use ports, airfields and similar installations on the territory of countries of the region. And primarily the United States and also Great Britain could avail themselves, as, incidentally, they are already availing themselves, of this opportunity. As far as France is concerned, its military activity is concentrated on its "overseas territories".

Those who insisted on the incorporation in the treaty of article 5 are attempting to justify their position by the need for respect for and compliance with international law in the part thereof concerning freedom of navigation and aeronautics. Such an intention can only be welcomed, which cannot be said of the difference in interpretation of this freedom. Thus the desire of the USSR--within the framework of the development of mutually profitable economic relations--to conclude fishing agreements with certain island states of Oceania is immediately presented by imperialist circles as an example of "Soviet expansionism" and some kind of "threat" to the countries of the region.

At the same time, however, the regular visits by American missile-carrying submarines of the Cockburn Sound (west coast of Australia) base are considered as "going without saying". B-52 strategic bombers have an opportunity when making flights over the Indian Ocean to land at the Australian air base in Darwin (in the north of the continent), at which the United States permanently keeps service personnel. Major American communications, tracking and guidance stations (North West Cape, Pine Gap and [Narrangara]), which play an important part in supporting the functioning of the nuclear-space component of the United States' military machine, are located on Australian territory. All this compels special attention to the provisions of articles 3 and 5 of the treaty, which speak of renunciation of the possession and prevention of the deployment on one's territory of nuclear explosive devices, but do not say one word about their delivery systems (among which, for example, are those same B-52 bombers, missiles installed on submarines and so forth).

IV

Granted all the complexities connected with the formulation of the "Avarua Treaty," complexities engendered to a considerable extent by disagreements between participants in the South Pacific Forum, and granted the existence of the barriers which still have to be overcome in the way of implementation of the provisions recorded in the treaty, the decision adopted on Rarotonga Island contains a considerable positive charge.

In the subregional plane the "treaty setting" of antinuclear sentiments at interstate level could serve as a stimulus to their further spread among the broad public and active introduction in the foreign policy of the governments of the forum's countries as an important element thereof. States which both

signed the "Avarua Treaty"* and which have not signed it, but which support certain of its provisions have acquired an instrument of collective influence on the policy of the leading imperialist powers in this part of the world. The document in question will contribute to growth of international-political self-awareness in the young ocean states.

It should be mentioned particularly that the "Avarua Treaty" goes beyond the subregional framework--it is of significance for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Thus a number of its provisions is consonant with the antinuclear demands of the peoples of Micronesia,** whose relations with countries of the South Pacific Forum have enjoyed certain development in recent years (it has observer status in this organization). An active antinuclear position is occupied by a part of Micronesia--the Republic of Belau.

At the UN General Assembly special session held on 16 October 1985 devoted to the decolonization process a collective statement made by a group of East European socialist countries observed, in particular: "The policy of the dismemberment of Micronesia, the conversion of which into a U.S. military base is contrary to the aspiration of the Pacific states to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, is causing serious concern."

The initiative of the South Pacific countries has also revived interest in the problem of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. And here also the main obstacle to the realization of this idea is the policy of imperialism, American primarily, and its close military-political relations with a number of ASEAN countries. In particular, on the territory of the Philippines there are, inter alia, two bases of strategic significance which are the Pentagon's biggest military facilities outside of the United States--the Subic Bay naval base and the Clark Field air base. Washington is endeavoring by might and main to preserve and strengthen its military presence in Southeast Asia. It is attempting for this purpose, in particular, to impede the establishment of constructive dialogue between the Indochina countries and the ASEAN states. Given the absence of such a dialogue, it is easier for the United States to counteract the conversion of Southeast Asia into a zone of lasting peace, stability, good-neighborliness and cooperation. Serious concern was caused in Washington by the fact that in the wake of the adoption in 1984 at the 15th session of the South Pacific Forum of a decision in principle on the creation of a nuclear-free zone ASEAN returned once again to discussion of the question of the establishment of such a zone in its subregion. Although it is as yet too

* Papua New Guinea subscribed to it on 16 September 1985--the 10th anniversary of the proclamation of its independence.

**Since 1947 it has been a UN trust territory administered by the United States. The latter, in violation of the UN Charter, had split Micronesia by the start of the 1980's into four formations: the Community of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Belau (Palau archipelago) and the Federated States of Micronesia (the Central and East Carolines and a number of other islands).

early to speak of any pronounced practical actions in this field, the "Avarua Treaty" could undoubtedly perform a certain stimulating role here. Indonesian Foreign Minister M. Kusumatmaadja declared, in particular, that the antinuclear treaty concluded by the participants in the forum serves "as an expression of the Pacific countries' firm position on this question."

The movement for the creation of a nuclear-free zone is having a positive impact on the South Pacific states' position on problems of peace and disarmament as a whole, and not only at the regional level. Thus Australian Foreign Minister W. Hayden, welcoming the moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons announced by the Soviet Union, called for a mutually agreed renunciation of testing and emphasized that there was no alternative to a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests which was all-embracing and subject to verification.

The Australian Government has declined to support President R. Reagan's "strategic defense initiative". We believe, W. Hayden declared, addressing the UN General Assembly 40th Session, that the maximum attention should be paid to the mobilization of efforts to ensure that space be used solely for peaceful purposes. Support for actions aimed at an end to the nuclear arms race was also reflected in the speeches delivered from the UN rostrum by the representatives of New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Western Samoa and other participants in the South Pacific forum.

The movement for the creation of nuclear-free zones, which has encompassed various parts of the world, is contributing to the development of the political cooperation of the states which support this idea. The political contacts between New Zealand and Sweden may be cited as an example. Back at the end of the 1970's the latter, as is known, banned calls in its territorial waters of warships with nuclear weapons on board and actively advocates nuclear disarmament and supports, in particular, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe.

V

Naturally, the position of the nuclear powers (upon realization of such partial measures as the creation of nuclear-free zones) is extraordinarily important primarily from the viewpoint of a positive solution of the problems of nuclear disarmament. Taking this circumstance into consideration and taking account of all aspects thereof connected with the implementation of the provisions of the "Avarua Treaty," the countries of the South Pacific Forum appended thereto three protocols addressed to the nuclear powers.

Protocol I pertains to the United States, Great Britain and France inasmuch as they control, in accordance with this legal status or the other, certain territories within the confines of the zone defined by the "Avarua Treaty". Thus for France this means New Caledonia and French Polynesia and also the Wallis and Futuna islands. The United States owns Eastern Samoa, while Great Britain owns Pitcairn Island. According to the protocol, the said nuclear powers may assume in respect of the enumerated territories the basic commitments assumed in accordance with the treaty (articles 3, 5 and 6) by the South Pacific Forum members.

The two other protocols are opened for signing by all the nuclear powers. Protocol II provides for the commitments: first, not to contribute to any actions which represent a violation of the provisions of the treaty and its protocols by the countries which have signed them; second, not to use nuclear explosive devices and not to threaten their use against subscribers to the treaty and the South Pacific territories controlled by the powers which sign Protocol I. Protocol III deals with the commitment not to test any nuclear explosive devices within the confines of the nuclear-free zone.

Consultations with the nuclear powers which consider these protocols acceptable to themselves are envisaged for final touches to the wording contained in the protocols. It is planned examining the results of the consultations, if such take place, at the session of the South Pacific Forum in 1986.

For realization of the provisions of the "Avarua Treaty" paramount significance in the light of the facts expounded above is attached to the reaction thereto on the part of Washington and Paris. And it cannot be called promising.

The point being that the treaty on the nuclear-free zone, as, equally, the New Zealand Government's ban on calls at its ports of ships carrying nuclear weapons, not only affects the Pentagon's military activity in the subregion but is also perceived politically as an extremely undesirable precedent from the viewpoint of the United States. Washington fears a chain reaction of the spread of anti-nuclear sentiments and, what is most important, the adoption under the influence thereof of practical steps which could impede realization of the United States' military-political strategy within the framework of the entire Asia-Pacific region.

It is here that the reason for the power pressure to which New Zealand is being subjected on the part of the United States lies. In Canberra in July 1985 in connection with the Australian-American negotiations being conducted there, which had replaced the annual meeting of the participants in the ANZUS bloc (Washington had insisted on its cancellation on account of Wellington's antinuclear measures), Secretary of State G. Shultz publicly expressed "serious reservations" in respect of the plans for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. According to press reports, the United States is putting pressure on some participants in the forum to ensure that they not sign the "Avarua Treaty".

At the same time, however, Washington cannot fail to consider, albeit partially, the interests of its most important ally in the region--Australia. Yet Canberra has already made it understood that it expects U.S. assistance in prompting France to cease nuclear tests. The Australian Government has also proposed reducing the number of calls by American warships at ports of the country's west coast.

In turn, France has unequivocally declared its intention to continue nuclear explosions on Mururoa Atoll, which (together with the well-known circumstances connected with the blowing up of the "Rainbow Warrior" in the port of the New Zealand city of Auckland) has contributed to an exacerbation of relations between Paris on the one hand and Canberra and Wellington on the other. Last year even W. Hayden warned of the possibility of "stricter actions" on the part of

Australia in addition to the halt to supplies to France of uranium ore as a sign of protest against its nuclear tests.

There is no doubt that implementation of the "Avarua Treaty" will require prolonged and significant efforts--and not only on the part of the South Pacific states.

As far as the Soviet Union's position is concerned, it believes that countries which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have such on their territory have the right to dependable international-law guarantees of their security and to the fact that nuclear weapons will not be used against them.

In September 1985, during the UN General Assembly 40th Session, talks were held in New York between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and Australian Foreign Minister W. Hayden and G. Palmer, deputy prime minister of New Zealand. The Soviet side confirmed the USSR's positive attitude toward the decision of the South Pacific countries to create a nuclear-free zone in this region and noted the positive reaction which this decision had evoked in the world.

The idea put forward by the Soviet Union of a comprehensive approach to ensuring security in Asia and the Pacific elicited extensive comment. The implementation of measures of a regional nature could make a considerable contribution to the strengthening of international security and a curbing of the arms race.

The statement of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee on 22-23 October in Sofia emphasized the particular significance of the consolidation of peace and cooperation in Asia and the Pacific and a strengthening of trust and security here. It noted, in particular, that the efforts of the South Pacific states to create a nuclear-free zone serve the interests of ensuring general security.

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9274

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

PRAVDA HITS BINARY WEAPONS PLANS

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Dec 85 p 5

[Article by Nataliya Larionova under the rubric "Response to the Reader":
"Creators of Silent Death"]

"Especially in recent times the United States has been stepping up the production of chemical weapons -- precisely binary nerve-paralytic ammunition. An earnest request: tell about this chemical weapon in more detail." N. Minkov of Odessa

In fact, the United States now stands on the threshold of series production of binary nerve-paralytic charges -- one of the most dangerous types of chemical weapons. From the technological standpoint it differs from the conventional type in that it consists of two or more components in separate containers. When the shells, bombs, and missiles explode, the components in them combine and a highly toxic lethal substance capable of destroying every living thing is formed from the resulting reaction. Even in very small quantities binary chemical compounds, acting on the human organism, above all the nerve system, kill or cripple people. Chemical weapons are intended to destroy living things and the civilian population, leaving material valuables intact. It is also dangerous since the real possibility is now emerging, by combining the components of binary ammunition, of obtaining new types of war gases, even so-called ethnic weapons able to selectively affect people of different races.

The American binary program is especially dangerous to Europe. In order to hold the NATO allies even more securely as their hostages and be able to operate from their territory with impunity, the United States is preparing to deploy binary weapons in Western Europe, specifically the FRG, England, and Italy, as well as in Turkey.

Binary ammunition will be on board American aircraft carriers in the form of "Big Eye" aerial bombs. Production is being planned of 155-millimeter binary artillery shells. The possibility is even developing of using binary weapons in sea-based cruise missiles. And the American "rapid deployment forces" are specially training to conduct military actions using chemical substances.

In 1969, under pressure from the public which was upset by the use of American chemical weapons in Indochina, then-president R. Nixon was forced to freeze

the production of nerve gas. Nonetheless, at the same time experiments with the prototypes of binary howitzer shells were conducted at the military facility at the Dugway Proving Grounds and a program for developing American binary cluster bombs was being worked out. Then in 1980 the House of Representatives of the American Congress adopted a decision to build an enterprise to produce binary weapons in the city Pine Bluff, Arkansas; it is now completely ready to start up. This enterprise is only the first intended to produce lethal binary charges. It is well known that the United States has 15 modern plants temporarily closed down, which could be put on line to produce war gas at any moment.

At the present time the United States has the largest arsenal of chemical weapons in the world: about 150,000 tons of war gas and more than 3 million chemical shells, missiles, aerial bombs, and mines. In July after the semblance of a "major struggle," a conference committee of the Senate and House of Representatives sanctioned the resumption of production of chemical nerve-gas weapons. Congress's decision envisions that about 160 million dollars will be allocated for the purpose of preparing for chemical warfare in the 1986 fiscal year, which begins on 1 October. But the entire program to modernize the U.S. military-chemical arsenal will devour more than 10 billion dollars.

About 90 state and private enterprises are working on developing and producing chemical weapons. Among them is Union Carbide, which for many years has been one of the Pentagon's main subcontractors for developing and producing components of chemical weapons. This company became scandalously famous as a result of the tragedy at its enterprise in the Indian city of Bhopal, where 2,500 people died and more than 50,000 inhabitants were crippled. Doctors established that the victims of the disaster were affected not only by methylized cyanate, which is used in the production of pesticides, but also some more powerful poisonous substance. It is now coming out that somewhere deep inside the Bhopal plant Union Carbide was working on industrial-scale production of dangerous new types of gas compounds which could be used as chemical weapons.

The tragedy in Bhopal involved thousands of victims. Like a drop of water, it reflects the manifold human suffering which the military use of chemical weapons can involve. At a recent summit meeting in Geneva the leaders of the USSR and the United States spoke out in favor of a universal and complete ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of the stockpiles of these weapons. They agreed to activate efforts to conclude an effective international and verifiable convention on this subject. Time will tell what the United States' practical steps in this direction will be.

12424

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RELATED ISSUES

CANADIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER ON GORBACHEV PROPOSALS

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 24 Jan 86 p A9

[Article by David Vienneau]

[Text]

OTTAWA — Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev should repeat his recent arms control proposals at the negotiating table in Geneva if he wants them to be taken seriously, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark says.

He told the House of Commons yesterday that while the federal government welcomes Gorbachev's suggestions, they are little more than the most recent in a long history of proposals made by both superpowers.

"They contain some intriguing new elements alongside well-worn positions and some disturbing preconditions that could hamper negotiation," Clark said. "They clearly warrant very serious consideration, but there are also many aspects that require clarification."

"The real test of the Soviet Union's commitment to radical and verifiable arms reductions will come when it moves from the stage of public diplomacy to the confidential confines of the negotiation room."

15-year schedule

Last week, on the eve of the fourth round of the Geneva arms control talks, Gorbachev proposed a 15-year timetable for ridding the Earth of nuclear weapons. He also extended a Soviet freeze on nuclear testing by three months.

But in his statement the Soviet leader made it clear the plan

would depend on the U.S. abandoning its Strategic Defence Initiative, the space-based missile defence program called Star Wars.

Clark, who was responding formally to the Soviet proposals, made little or no reference to the condition or the proposed timetable or Star Wars and was mildly criticized by the opposition critics for not doing so.

Liberal MP Jean Chretien said the main obstacle to progress in the nuclear arms talks is space weaponry and it "disturbed me" that Clark had not mentioned it in his remarks.

He said it has been suggested that SDI was really put forward as a means of coercing the Soviets into returning to the negotiating table. He said now that it has been accomplished, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should ask the U.S. to reconsider its position on Star Wars.

"I do think the NATO nations should talk to the Americans and try at least to do something positive on SDI, not necessarily to put it aside forever, but perhaps make the point it might be slowed down or frozen to give the talks a chance to make progress," Chretien said.

He said Canada should send the Soviets a signal to show them they are not "operating in isolation." He suggested the government reconsider its position on the testing of the cruise missile, a

program that was approved by the previous Liberal government.

New Democrat Pauline Jewett said she was surprised that Clark had not mentioned the most exciting thing about Gorbachev's proposals — the first timetable for nuclear disarmament recommended by either of the superpowers.

Glimmer of hope

"I found that the most innovative of Gorbachev's proposals," she said.

"It makes one feel that we might make it to the end of the century. I would have liked that seen by the minister as perhaps the central key to the Gorbachev proposals."

Gorbachev said that in the initial five to eight years the superpowers could work to cutting by half their strategic missiles arsenals, those weapons capable of reaching each other's territory, and limiting the remaining long-range missiles to 6,000 warheads per side.

In the second stage, to begin no later than 1990 and lasting up to seven years, Gorbachev said other nuclear states would begin to engage in nuclear disarmament by freezing all their nuclear arms and not locating them in other countries.

The final stage, to begin in 1995, would concentrate on eliminating all remaining nuclear weapons on Earth and the negotiating of a universal agreement not to bring them into being again.

/9274

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RELATED ISSUES

CANADA: 'PEOPLE'S INQUIRY' HELD ON NANOOSE BAY TEST RANGE

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 20 Jan 86 p A4

[Text] Nanaimo, B.C.

Concerned citizens discussed potential nuclear accidents and Canadian sovereignty at a weekend conference while complaining about a lack of information on a nearby weapons testing range used by the U.S. Navy.

The 500 participants at the "people's inquiry" into the Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental Testing Range off Nanoose Bay, 20 kilometres north of this Vancouver Island city, heard experts talk about the risk of radiation from the visits of nuclear-powered U.S. submarines and warships.

Peace activists urged that a Canadian-U.S. agreement that allows the visits of such vessels, which could be carrying nuclear weapons, not be renewed when it expires on April 14. Some argued it amounts to an infringement of Canadian sovereignty.

Dr. Dorothy Goresky, national

president of Physicians for Social Responsibility, told the conference in vivid detail the catastrophic effects a nuclear blast would have on people.

"There is no possible medical response to a nuclear war," she said.

Little specific information is available about the Nanoose range. The conference received a background paper from the Department of National Defence that provided a history and general description of the base but did not elaborate on such matters as radiation levels and safety monitoring.

But the department wasn't represented at the meeting. The Conservative and Liberal parties and the local chamber of commerce also declined to attend.

Military policy is neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on visiting American vessels.

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END